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Reputation in a Networked World:  Revisiting
the Social Foundations of Defamation Law
David S. Ardia*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a moderately successful actor named Ron Living-
ston, having starred in the cult hit Office Space.  On your return from your
honeymoon, your publicist calls you to say that someone edited your
Wikipedia entry to falsely state that you are in a gay relationship with a
casting director you have never heard of before.  You do not see any prob-
lem with being gay, but you are concerned that it might reduce your chances
of landing another acting job in Hollywood.  You want the information re-
moved, and you think a defamation lawsuit might be the best solution.1
Filing a lawsuit, however, raises some obvious concerns.  Defamation
suits are complex and take a long time to litigate.  You are not certain you
will win, given that society’s view of being homosexual is changing.  If you
file a lawsuit, will the public perceive you as homophobic and an enemy of
free speech?  Do people believe what they read on Web sites such as
Wikipedia, especially when the source is anonymous?  Even if you do win,
won’t the information likely still reside somewhere in the dark corners of the
Internet?  In the end, is anyone going to know or care that a court in Los
Angeles has found the person liable for defamation?
Using Mr. Livingston’s case as a lens through which to examine defa-
mation law’s operation in our increasingly networked society, this article
argues that defamation law suffers from significant doctrinal and practical
limitations that preclude it from achieving its goal of protecting reputation.
Cognizant of these limitations, it offers some guidelines for reforming defa-
mation law, suggesting that existing monetary remedies should be deem-
phasized while alternative approaches that seek to correct inaccurate
information and provide opportunities for contextualization should be
emphasized.
* Resident Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School.  Help-
ful feedback was provided by Fernando Bermejo, Jack Goldsmith, Donnie Hao Dong, Mary-
Rose Papandrea, Hal Roberts, Carolina Rossini, Wendy Seltzer, and members of the Yale-
Harvard-MIT Cyberscholars Working Group.  Valuable research assistance was provided by
David O’Brien.
1 This scenario is predominately based on a recent lawsuit filed in Los Angeles County
Superior Court. See Coupleguys, Inc. v. John Doe, No. BC-427389 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Dec.
4, 2009).  The complaint in the case was filed by Coupleguys, Inc., “a ‘loan-out’ corporation
that furnishes the professional services of Ron Livingston in the entertainment industry.” Id.
at 2.
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It is time again to rethink defamation law.2  The law we know today
saw its origin in feudal times, expanded to serve as a counterweight to the
disruption occasioned by the printing press, and was constitutionalized by
the Supreme Court in the low-participation age of broadcast and print mass
media. The journalistic institutions that led the fight for constitutional reform
are now in decline while online platforms optimized for high participation,
such as blogs, social networks, and discussion forums, are in ascendency.  In
this age of the “networked information economy,”3 reputation occupies a
very different role in the social order than it did even twenty years ago.
Existing legal doctrines that seek to protect reputation do so by provid-
ing remedies—almost exclusively financial—that account for injuries to the
affected individual without regard to societal interests.  Yet injuries to repu-
tation are not borne exclusively, or even primarily, by the affected individ-
ual.  In many ways, reputation is a quintessential public good.  We cannot
have a reputation except insofar as it is created in cooperation with others
and relative to our relationships with them.4  Reputation is an emergent
property of these interactions.  It serves an important signaling function by
communicating complex information about the individual and about the in-
dividual’s place within society.  When an individual’s reputation is improp-
erly maligned, it degrades the value and reliability of this information and
devalues community identity.
Global communication networks such as the Internet have made reputa-
tion more enduring and yet more ephemeral.  Reputation is more enduring
because information about us, whether good or bad, can exist—and be easily
retrievable—forever.  Powerful search engines scour and index photos,
videos, and text.  Semantic connections link previously disparate pieces of
information to individuals and to each other.  In the past, much personal
information was publicly inaccessible because of practical impediments to
its access.  The Internet is largely eliminating these impediments.
2 There have been many past attempts to reform the law of defamation; the last significant
effort occurred in the 1980s. See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM, PROPOSAL
FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW (1988) (“Annenberg Proposal” ); REFORMING LIBEL LAW
(John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992) (presenting and summarizing various reform
proposals).  In fact, it is difficult to find anyone who believes defamation law should continue
unchanged. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
487, 487 n.3 (1991) (collecting scholarly and popular criticism of defamation law).  Yet there
is little agreement on how it should be modified.  I do not, in this article, attempt to layout
another comprehensive reform proposal, but only to offer a way of conceptualizing reputation
in a networked world that may benefit the discussion of whether and how defamation law
should be reformed.
3 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 44 (2006) (observing that due in part to the Internet, “[b]oth the
capacity to make meaning—to encode and decode humanly meaningful statements—and the
capacity to communicate one’s meaning around the world, are held by, or readily available to,
at least many hundreds of millions of users around the globe.”).
4 Of course, reputation is not solely an individual interest.  It holds enormous importance
for business entities, which are covered by doctrines such as trade libel and trademark law.
The focus of this article, however, is on personal reputation.
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At the same time, our reputations are more ephemeral because they are
open to onslaughts from many more sources. Indeed, maintaining a “good”
reputation is no simple matter.  The Internet is replete with anonymous and
pseudonymous speech that criticizes, disparages, and defames.5  The old ap-
proach of sending a cease and desist letter or demanding a retraction no
longer accomplishes its purpose.  Even if an embarrassing video has been
removed from YouTube or a defamatory statement has resulted in a finding
of liability, the injurious information often lives on in social networks, blogs,
and vast online data repositories easily accessed with a search engine.
Indeed, many of the social norms that underlie defamation law were
established when individuals were connected to a relatively small number of
people defined largely by physical geography.  But the Internet now con-
nects us to hundreds of millions of people.  Our existing notions of how to
establish trust and maintain social ties do not always translate to this
networked world.  As a result, traditional approaches to protecting reputation
that were blunt and ineffective before the networked self arose, are even less
effective today.
The legal doctrines that deal with reputational harms have not kept pace
with these changes.  The heterogeneous networked society we know today is
far different from the feudal system that predominated during the thirteenth
century when the law of slander got its start or even the more enlightened
seventeenth century, when the Court of Star Chamber developed the law of
libel in response to the printing press.  While the way we use reputation has
evolved—and is evolving—along with our communication, political, and so-
cial systems, defamation law remains distressingly out of step with our in-
creasingly networked society.
The article begins in Part I by defining reputation and tracing its evolu-
tion and importance in humans and other social species.  Reviewing recent
research on reputation in evolutionary science, social science, and econom-
ics, Part I shows that reputation is part of a complex set of feedback mecha-
nisms within human social systems and has been a key driver in our
evolution.
Part II then considers how our networked society creates, disseminates,
and uses reputational information, noting that reputation plays many roles,
from facilitating transactions between disparate parties to constituting a form
of “social currency” in the production of goods in sharing economies.  In-
deed, studies examining the use of reputational information have forced us
to reassess our theories about human rationality and revealed to us the im-
portance of reputation to a cooperative society.
5 You do not have to look far to find false, harmful, and degrading speech online.  In fact,
some have argued that harmful and degrading speech on the Internet should be considered a
civil rights violation because the societal harm from such speech would otherwise go unad-
dressed. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 89 (2009).
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 4  8-OCT-10 15:13
264 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 45
Framing the legal analysis that follows, Part III briefly describes the
various common law doctrines that protect reputation and explores the un-
easy truce between defamation law and the First Amendment.  Part III then
turns to the Livingston case described at the start of the Article to illustrate
the challenges courts face in identifying the relevant community in whose
eyes a party has been defamed.  This inquiry is an essential part of every
defamation case because it is the community’s norms that define the line
between defamatory and non-defamatory speech.  The identification of the
relevant community, however, is fraught with normative judgments and as-
sumptions about society that do not account for how our modern networked
society actually functions.
Part IV suggests that we should take as our touchstone that reputation is
a societal interest and devise remedies that leverage the power of communi-
ties to deal with reputational harm.  Although the global communication net-
works that are the hallmarks of our networked society have brought new
reputational challenges, they also provide novel solutions to prevent and
ameliorate those harms.  One such solution is to enlist, through legal and
social incentives, the help of private online intermediaries such as content
hosts and search providers.  These intermediaries play a central role in com-
munity governance and are often in a position to recognize and respond to
reputational harms.  By harnessing the power of communities to deter and
mitigate reputational harm, we will be better able to balance the protection
of reputation with society’s desire to maintain an environment for speech
that is conducive to public engagement and vigorous debate.
I. THE NATURE OF REPUTATION
Reputation plays an integral role in how others see us and how we see
ourselves in the world.  It is also essential to the proper functioning of our
social and economic systems.  Reputation allows us to make assessments
about individuals and entities that we cannot directly observe.  It makes
complex social arrangements possible because it functions as a heuristic for
predicting the behavior of others, creating what political scientist Robert Ax-
elrod refers to as the “shadow of the future.”6
Although reputational information is pervasive—we use it, for exam-
ple, to buy a car, choose a physician, select a law school, or decide on a
mate—it remains a “mysterious thing.”7  Indeed, we often rely on this infor-
mation without thinking about how it was created and whether it is reliably
correlated with the attributes that are important.  What do we mean when we
speak of reputation?
6 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 125–26 (1984).
7 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Consti-
tution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986).
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As discussed in Part III below, the common law has not attempted to
define reputation and we ultimately come away dissatisfied with how judges
treat the topic.8  Hinting at reputation’s abstract social nature, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines it as the “esteem in which a person is held by others.”9
We gain a far better understanding of reputation, however, by examining the
biological and social sciences, which have long studied how humans and
other social species use reputation to build long-term relationships, detect
and respond to cheaters and free riders, and influence the behavior of peers.10
Indeed, research on reputation in evolutionary science, social science,
and economics is forcing us to reevaluate many long-held beliefs about
human rationality and motivation.  This research reveals that reputation is an
essential component in all human social systems.11  It is valuable not just to
the individual, but to society as a whole because it serves as a means of
facilitating the communication of complex social information.
A. The Evolution of Reputation
In a world with scarce resources, those who out-compete others gener-
ally enjoy greater success.12  In numerous human endeavors, from business
to politics, sports, and academics, individuals strive against others for the
purpose of achieving individual success.  One might assume from this com-
petition that cooperative behavior is exceedingly rare.  Indeed, many
problems of human society stem from or are exacerbated by a lack of coop-
eration.  Most public goods problems fit this description; when individuals
are free to overuse a public good, such as fish stocks or health care, they
8 The common law merely defines categories of reputational harm that the law will recog-
nize. See infra Part III.B.
9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10 Human behavior is similar to that of many other social species. See generally Carel P.
van Schaik & Peter M. Kappeler, Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Closing the Gap, in
COOPERATION IN PRIMATES AND HUMANS 4, 13–18 (P. Kappeler  & C.P. van Schaik eds.,
2006).  Among social species, however, humans engage in far more cooperative behaviors
than other species. See, e.g., Simon Ga¨chter & Benedikt Herrmann, Human Cooperation
From an Economic Perspective, in COOPERATION IN PRIMATES AND HUMANS 279 (P. Kappeler
& C.P. van Schaik eds., 2006); Peter Hammerstein, Why is Reciprocity So Rare in Social
Animals? A Protestant Appeal, in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 83
(P. Hammerstein ed., 2003).
11 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human
Altruism, 422 NATURE 137 (2003); Manfred Milinski et al., Reputation Helps Solve the “Trag-
edy of the Commons,” 415 NATURE 424 (2002).
12 The animating theory underlying evolutionary biology is Charles Darwin’s theory of
natural selection, which posits that individuals who out-compete others for access to resources
and mates enjoy greater reproductive success and therefore pass on more of their genes to the
next generation. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF
NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE
(1859).
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usually act in their individual best interest and over use it.13  This dilemma is
well known as the “tragedy of the commons.”14
Yet, despite the prevalence of competition, cooperative behavior is
widespread throughout human societies.  In fact, humans exhibit the most
interesting and perplexing form of cooperative behavior observed in biologi-
cal systems:  altruistic behavior, which involves individuals enduring per-
sonal cost for the benefit of others.15  On the surface, evidence of altruistic
behavior would seem to challenge established theories of evolution.  As any-
one who has completed a course in biology knows, there is a selective ad-
vantage to being selfish.16  Charles Darwin recognized that altruistic
behavior presented a “‘special difficulty,’ potentially fatal to his whole the-
ory of natural selection.”17  The challenge for social scientists and evolution-
ary biologists is to explain how and why such apparently self-sacrificing
behavior evolved.18
Why do a good deed for another?  Why endure the risk of exploitation
and free riding?  It is not much of a stretch to envision altruistic acts between
related individuals or between individuals who have repeated and frequent
interactions.  When individuals interact within small groups, an individual
who benefited from the altruistic act or directly observed the behavior will
likely reciprocate.  But the fact that altruistic behavior persisted as the
human social sphere expanded from kin groups to a globally networked pub-
lic requires something far more profound.19  Indeed, humans maintain social
ties across great distances and across disparate human communities where
the ability to directly observe the behavior of partners is impossible.20  And
we do so primarily through a trade-based economic system that requires not
only the ability to compare the relative values of another’s goods and
13 The overfishing of many of the world’s fish species is an example of the over use of a
“public good” and the general failure to attain cooperation among coastal nations.  See David
Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the
Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 497, 505–08 (1998).
14 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
15 For biologists, cooperative acts that are beneficial for both actor and recipient are called
mutualistic; cooperative acts that are costly to the actor but beneficial to the recipient are
termed altruistic.  van Schaik & Kappeler, supra note 10, at 3. R
16 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
17 van Schaik & Kappeler, supra note 10, at 5; see also L.A. DUGATKIN, COOPERATION R
AMONG ANIMALS: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE (1997).
18 Among social species, humans often engage in what biologists call “reciprocal behav-
ior,” responding to helpful and harmful acts in kind.  Most surprisingly, we do so even if those
acts have been directed not at us but at others.  The term biologists use to describe this form of
behavior is “indirect reciprocity.” See Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altru-
ism, 46 Q. REV. BIOL. 35, 35 (1971).  Roughly speaking, indirect reciprocity equates to the
principle:  “‘You scratch my back and I’ll scratch someone else’s’ or ‘I scratch your back and
someone else will scratch mine.’”  Martin Nowack & Karl Sigmund, Evolution of Indirect
Reciprocity, 437 NATURE 1291, 1291 (2005).
19 See, e.g., Sam Bowles, Conflict: Altruism’s Midwife, 456 NATURE 326, 327 (2008).
20 Gachter & Herrmann, supra note 10, at 287 (finding that “humans often help each other R
or cooperate even if this act of altruism is not likely to be reciprocated”).
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services, but also to assess and accept—on faith—tokens as symbolic
payment.21
What makes humankind uniquely capable of creating complex social
systems is our ability to assess, process, and communicate reputational infor-
mation.22  This reputational information is distinguishable from other behav-
ioral cues in that it allows third parties—who have had no previous
involvement with the original parties—to make assessments about the char-
acteristics (e.g., honesty, skill, kindness) of others.  The ability to assess a
previously unknown party’s reputation helps explain how cooperation was
achievable at all when human interactions moved beyond small villages
where one could rely on a history of personal interactions.
B. The Social Foundations of Reputation
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that reputation is an
emergent property of social interactions.23  Reputation is continuously being
constituted through our interactions with others.  This web of connections
leaves impressions, the sum of which comprises our reputation.  Reputation
is thus a form of social “capital” that is amassed within social networks.24
But reputation is not something we create ourselves.  It is socially con-
structed.25  We cannot have a reputation except insofar as it is produced in
cooperation with others and relative to our relationships with them.26 As a
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Nowack & Sigmund, supra note 18, at 1291.  While the use of reputation has R
been hypothesized in some non-human primates, it has been observed primarily in humans.
See John Mitani, Reciprocal Exchange in Chimpanzees and Other Primates, in COOPERATION
IN PRIMATES AND HUMANS 116–17 (P. Kappeler & C. van Schaik eds., 2006).  Not surpris-
ingly, humankind’s use of reputational information has played a “pivotal role in the evolution
of collaboration and communication” and “may have provided the selective challenge driving
the cerebral expansion in human evolution.”  Nowack & Sigmund, supra note 18, at 1291. R
Intriguingly, reputation also is believed to be connected with the origins of moral norms. Id.
(observing that “humans not only feel strongly about interactions that involve them directly,
they also judge the actions between third parties, as demonstrated by the contents of gossip”)
(internal citation omitted).
23 Reputation is emergent in the same way that prices are created by the interaction of
economic actors in a market; the value of a good, as reflected by its price, emerges from the
interaction of buyers and sellers. See Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek,
And The Economic Analysis Of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008) (noting that “market
price for a particular good or service emerges from the decentralized interaction of many
individuals.”).
24 Christian Hahn et al., Social Reputation: A Mechanism for Flexible Self-Regulation of
Multiagent Systems, 10 J. ARTIFICIAL SOC’YS & SOC. SIMULATION 3.1 (2007) (referring to
reputation as a form of “symbolic capital”).
25 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (observing that reputation “is defined more by its effect on the
‘others’ who make up the plaintiff’s ‘community’ than by its effect on the individual plaintiff”).
26 As Susan Crawford notes, “[e]veryone who makes up our ‘group’ has a hand in our
identity, and we emerge over and over again changed by the interactions we have with that
group (or those groups).”  Susan Crawford, Who’s In Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law
Online, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 211, 213 (2004-2005).
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consequence, “[reputation’s] very nature is indelibly social.”27  We may be
able to influence, to a limited extent, the information others use to assess our
reputation, but the ultimate opinions that others hold of us are outside our
control.
It is clear, then, that our reputation does not reside in us at all.28  Repu-
tation, “inheres in the social apprehension we have of each other.”29  As
Count Annibale Romei observed in the Courtiers Academie, a sixteenth cen-
tury treatise on honor, “good opinion is the proper essence of honor . . . that
honor essentially is in the honorer . . . bicause [sic] in him remaineth the
opinion.”30  This latter point highlights the distinction between reputation
and character.  “Character is what a person really is; reputation is what he
seems to be.”31
This view of reputation is in keeping with current sociological theories
of identity formation that posit that a coherent identity is formed in relation
to others and develops and changes over time.32  In The Presentation of Self
in Everyday Life, Erving Goffman wrote that our identities are developed
and maintained through the interaction and cooperation of other people.33
According to Goffman, each “individual must rely on others to complete the
picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts.”34
One need look no further than the fads and fashions that characterize adoles-
cent social groups to see how identities are formed and affected by the
groups themselves.35  Not only is reputation created by social interactions
27 Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. REV.
743, 743 (1986).
28 See Frederick George Bailey, Gifts and Poison, in GIFTS AND POISON: THE POLITICS OF
REPUTATION 1, 4 (F.G. Bailey ed., 1971) (observing that “[a] man’s reputation is not a quality
that he possesses, but rather the opinions which other people have about him”); Bellah, supra
note 27, at 743 (noting that “although we think of a person as ‘having’ a reputation, reputation R
is not a property or possession of individuals-it is a relation between persons”).
29 Post, supra note 7, at 692. R
30 COUNT ANNIBALE ROMEI, THE COURTIERS ACADEMIE: COMPREHENDING SEUEN SEUER-
ALL DAYES DISCOURSES 109 (1598) (emphasis added).
31 Von Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation II, 4 COLUM. L.
REV. 33, 33 (1904) (observing that “it is reputation, not character, which the law aims to
protect”).
32 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 208 (1959);
WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 279-80 (1890) (“[A] man’s Self is the sum total
of what he calls his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house
. . . his reputation and works . . . If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle
and die away, he feels cast down.”).
33 GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 208. R
34 ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 84-85 (1967) (“While it may be true that the
individual has a unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of
joint ceremonial labor, the part expressed through the individual’s demeanor being no more
significant than the part conveyed by others through their deferential behavior toward him.”).
35 See Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Pub-
lics in Teenage Social Life, in DIGITAL LEARNING—YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA
119, 129–31 (David Buckingham ed., 2007).  As John Clippinger observes, “[b]eing able to
control an identity boundary is equivalent to carving out a social niche and is as critical to
social survival as an ecological niche is to environmental survival.” JOHN HENRY CLIPPINGER,
A CROWD OF ONE: THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 154 (2007).  Theodor Seuss Geissel
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between individuals within communities, it is contextual.  Reputational
value is idiosyncratically determined by community members.  For example,
scientists, artists, and academics typically have unique criteria for assessing
reputation and standing within their peer groups “that are not easily accessi-
ble to those outside their networks.”36  As discussed in the next section, this
is especially apparent on the Internet, which has facilitated the flourishing of
communities organized around idiosynchratic and esoteric subjects.37
That being said, reputational judgment will even vary from person to
person.  Each person makes her own individualized assessments of individu-
als based on the information she has.  Even when others have the same infor-
mation about us, they see things, and attach values, in different ways.  The
killing of another person provides a clear illustration of this point.  As Judge
Learned Hand observed in Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., even this act is
not universally condemned:
We are sensitive to the charge of murder only because our fellows
deprecate it in most forms; but a head-hunter . . . or a gangster,
would regard such an accusation as a distinction, and during the
Great War an “ace,” a man who had killed five others, was held in
high regard.38
The elusive nature of reputation, however, has not diminished its im-
portance to society.  Reputation serves an essential function by communicat-
ing complex information about individuals and their places within society.
By projecting the repercussions of actions into the future, it makes altruistic,
cooperative social interactions possible.  Evolutionary biologists also tell us
that our use of reputational information has been a significant driver of so-
cial complexity, and our use of reputation is continuing to evolve.  For these
biologists, many of whom view the emergence of human society as the “last
(up to now) . . . major transition[ ] in evolution,”39 the question of how our
(Dr. Seuss) captures this phenomenon in The Sneetches and Other Stories, in which Sylvester
McMonkey McBean first offers the Sneetches the opportunity to put stars on their bellies and
then offers to remove them, all for a price. See DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STO-
RIES 1, 19 (1961).
36 CLIPPINGER, supra note 35, at 93; see also Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 167 N.E. R
432, 433–34 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1929) (finding statement defamatory even though plaintiff’s repu-
tation would only be harmed amongst experts on Palestinian history and customs).
37 See infra Part II.
38 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936).  While the law in Shakespeare’s time considered
Othello’s killing of his wife to be murder, the importance of reputation and a man’s need to
preserve it was viewed as strong justification for such a killing.  “[A] man arraigned for either
[killing an adulterous wife or another man in a duel] would be respected by his fellow aristo-
crats, as many contemporary authors admitted, more or less reluctantly.  Gentlemen of the
Renaissance not only respected those who lived by the code, but they also disdained action
from civil courts in almost any area of honor, especially in cases of dueling or adultery.”  Jean
Klene, Othello: A Fixed Figure for the Time of Scorn, 26 SHAKESPEARE Q. 139, 149 (1975);
see also RUTH KELSO, THE DOCTRINE OF THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN IN THE SIXTEENTH CEN-
TURY 103–04 (1929).
39 Nowack & Sigmund, supra note 18, at 1291. R
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use of reputation can keep pace with our social systems is quite profound.
This question sparks a veritable gold rush within the social, natural, and
computer sciences to understand how complex social systems create, dis-
seminate, and ensure the reliability of reputational information.40
Applying some of this work to the online environment, Professor Judith
Donath, founder of the Sociable Media Group at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, suggests that online social network sites such as MySpace
and Facebook may be “the harbinger of the next stage in human social
evolution.”41  The potential impact of this observation on the common law of
defamation is explored in Parts II and III.
II. REPUTATION IN A NETWORKED WORLD
Throughout most of human history, reputational information was cre-
ated through direct observation and communicated with word of mouth.42
Face-to-face sharing of “gossip” was the primary means of transmitting this
information signal.43  Human society expanded by using increasingly sophis-
ticated networks for communicating reputational information.44  The Internet
we know today is simply the current phase of this evolution.45  Society has
been becoming more networked over the past five centuries with the intro-
duction of new transportation and communication technologies, from sail to
steam, to the telegraph, telephone, and Internet.46  For example, early Ameri-
can communities relied on town criers, individuals who traveled—mostly on
40 See Lik Mui et al., Notions of Reputation in Multi-Agents Systems: A Review, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS: PART 1, July 15–19, 2002, Bologna, Italy (summarizing research
across various disciplines).
41 Judith Donath, Signals in Social Supernets, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 12, 14
(2007).
42 See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Chal-
lenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1407, 1407 (2003).
43 See ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 171–74
(1996); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CON-
TROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 7 (2007); Bailey, supra note 28, at 4. R
44 For a definition of network-based social structures, see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY 501–03 (2000).  Pioneering work on the study of human social net-
works was begun in the 1970s by Barry Wellman. See, e.g., Barry Wellman, The Community
Question: The Intimate Networks of East Yorkers, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1201 (1979).
45 The advent of writing and papyrus has been described as the first “revolution” in infor-
mation technology. IRVING FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION: SIX INFORMATION
REVOLUTIONS 3 (1997).  There is strong evidence, however, that our path toward a networked
society began when homo sapiens learned language.  “One reason to suspect that language
may have initially evolved . . . is that individual reputations—in which individuals become
known as liars or as good sources of information—may provide an important ‘cost’ to decep-
tion in human communication.” CARL T. BERGSTROM ET AL., THE PEACOCK, THE SPARROW,
AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 25 (2001).
46 For a view of how these technologies have affected American society, see generally
RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY (1997).
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foot—from town to town carrying news and gossip.47  In those days, infor-
mation traveled only as fast as existing transportation systems allowed.48
Communities were relatively small and insular; most people knew each
other and information was filtered through personal interactions.49
While nineteenth-century America could be described as networked in
the sense that there were roads and courier systems that connected villages
and cities, society did not begin to transcend physical space until the wide-
spread use of railroads and telegraphs.  These tools offered efficient trans-
portation and “revolutioniz[ed] the way humans communicated, leading to
what one historian has termed the ‘Victorian Internet.’” 50  With the telegraph
came “national” newspapers that could print and distribute news from all
over the country.51  Radio further connected communities, and broadcast tel-
evision ushered in the age of mass media.  People and information thus be-
came increasingly mobile.52
By the end of the twentieth century, a networked world existed.  Today,
low-cost, high-bandwidth data communication networks stretch across the
nation and the globe, creating what Professor Yochai Benkler calls the
“networked information economy.”53  According to Benkler, “[t]he techni-
cal conditions of communication and information processing are enabling
the emergence of new social and economic practices of information and
knowledge production.”54  This has “fundamentally altered the capacity of
individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active participants in the pub-
lic sphere.”55
As a result, communities, and the individuals that comprise them, are
no longer constrained by physical and social space.56  Virtual communities
47 See JOSEPH DILLAWAY SAWYER, HISTORY OF THE PILGRIMS AND PURITANS: THEIR AN-
CESTRY AND DESCENDENTS 28 (1922); WILLIAM DAVID SLOAN ET AL., THE MEDIA IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 28 (1993).
48 Historian Gordon Wood notes that in 1790 it took “more than a month for news to
travel from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia.” GORDON WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 479 (2009).
49 See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 21–22 (1986).
50 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (quoting TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE RE-
MARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS
vii–ix (1998)).
51 This is where the term “wire service” news came from. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DIS-
COVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 4 (1981).
52 For an insightful analysis of American status and mobility in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 22–34. R
53 BENKLER, supra note 3, at 32.  The Internet “is a network of networks, consisting of R
privately owned servers, routers, and backbones that communicate using a suite of common
languages.”  Ardia, supra note 50, at 16. R
54 BENKLER, supra note 3, at 33. R
55 Id. at 212.
56 This has resulted in what some claim is the weakened effectiveness and legitimacy of
the nation state. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Border—The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370–75 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace is a jurisdic-
tion independent of territorial sovereigns). But see JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CON-
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have sprung up, social networks have bloomed, and individuals are rushing
onto the Internet to engage, argue, and disparage each other.57  Indeed, it is
now possible for someone to have formed an opinion about me on the other
side of the world without ever meeting me.  In fact, that person may not even
speak the same language or have anything in common with me, but if she
has access to the Internet, she can read my writings or engage in a conversa-
tion with others about me.58
We see some of the changes engendered by the Internet’s facilitation of
disbursed information production in the Livingston case described in the in-
troduction.  Mr. Livingston, a modest celebrity, has an entry devoted to his
life and work on Wikipedia, the world’s largest collaboratively edited online
encyclopedia.59  Anyone, anywhere in the world, can create an entry or edit
an existing entry on Wikipedia.60  On sites such as Wikipedia, professional
editors do not verify the information.  Instead, this function is “crowd-
sourced” through the work of thousands of volunteers.61  Remarkably, be-
cause this editing work is done in public view—and tracked via Wikipedia’s
extensive editing and history tools—we actually know quite a bit about how
the information ended on up on Mr. Livingston’s entry on Wikipedia.  For
example, the editing logs appear to show that a user “made his first attempt
to romantically link the heterosexual (and real) Livingston with the gay,
TROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD ix (2006) (noting that territorial
sovereigns are no less relevant and important in the Internet age).
57 See Ardia, supra note 50, at 16 (noting that the Internet “facilitate[s] a diverse array of R
platforms for speech, including blogs, social networks, discussion forums, video and photo
hosting services, and collaboratively edited wikis”).
58 The widespread availability of free translation services such as Google Language and
Babelfish allow vast parts of the world to access information with little regard to language
barriers. See, e.g., Federico Gaspari, The Added Value of Free Online MT Services: Confi-
dence Boosters for Linguistically-Challenged Internet Users, a Case Study for the Language
Pair Italian-English, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR MA-
CHINE TRANSLATION IN THE AMERICAS 46, 54 (2006); Michael Liedtke, Google Introduces
Search Translation Tools, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2007 (reporting that Google is provid-
ing an automatic search translation service that allows non-English language searching of
Google’s English-language search index).
59 Wikepedia, Ron Livingston, http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ron_Livingston (last modi-
fied on Jan. 25, 2010). Wikipedia formally launched on January 15, 2001. See http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia#History.
60 See Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to
Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 164 (2006) (“Contributing to [Wikipedia] are hun-
dreds of thousands of volunteers scattered across the globe, with varying levels of expertise.
Anyone may edit or contribute to Wikipedia, and the contribution is immediately available to
the world.”).
61 See David A. Hoffman, Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L. J. 151, 154 (2009)
(“Wikipedia has developed a volunteer-run, highly articulated dispute resolution system.  That
system starts with the informal, guided exchange of views, muddles through mediation, and
ends with referral to an Arbitration Committee that hears evidence presented by the parties
before issuing findings of fact and conclusions of policy and law.”); see also Wikipedia, Dis-
pute Resolution, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution (last modified on
Feb. 15, 2010).
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non-existent [casting director]” on May 8, 2006.62  An “editing war” en-
sued, culminating in the lawsuit filed on December 5, 2009.63
Not surprisingly, the changes occasioned by the Internet have pro-
foundly altered the way individuals create, disseminate and use reputational
information.  The following sections highlight two of these changes.
A. Reputation: The Coin of the Online Realm
Reputation can be a strong motivating influence for altruistic behav-
ior.64  Reputation serves this function by acting as a form of “social cur-
rency,” bringing improved standing, access, and financial benefits.65
Competitive altruism can even develop as individuals seek to increase their
reputation through repeated good deeds.66  As human society has become
more networked, the opportunities to build and make use of this social cur-
rency have increased.
We see this quite clearly in the context of “sharing economies,”67
where reputation, rather than money, is a primary motivation for the work.68
Free, or open source,69 software development is a vivid example of the
power of reputation to drive cooperation in a highly complex, expertise-in-
62 Somey, It’s the Casting Director Lee Dennison Story!, WIKIPEDIA REV. (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://wikipediareview.com/blog/20091211/its-the-casting-director-lee-dennison-story/.
63 For a discussion of how the Wikipedia community handled the false information that is
the subject of the lawsuit, see infra notes 422-425 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
65 In the economics literature, the term “social capital” has been used to capture some of
these functions. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPI-
TAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 3 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 1999); Ed-
ward L. Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437, F438
(2002).  A number of economists, particularly Sam Bowles and Herbert Gintis, have argued
that the use of the term “social capital“ is misleading because “capital refers to thing that can
be owned,” but “the attributes said to make up social capital describe relationships among
people.”  Sam Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112
ECON. J. F419, F420 (2002).
66 Empirical studies involving social dilemma games have shown this effect. See Milin-
ski, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that players who alternate between indirect reciprocity and R
public goods games engaged in more cooperative behavior in both games).  This can serve as
important motivation for individuals to contribute to public goods problems. Id. at 271.
67 Lawrence Lessig, Do You Floss?, 27 LONDON REV. BOOKS 16 (2005), available at http:/
/www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n16/less01_.html; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux
and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002).  According to Lawrence Lessig,
this is an economy “in which unrelated individuals, often in remote parts of the world, ‘work’
together to produce private and collective goods.  The sharing economy is no less an economy
for that . . . . [I]t, too, produces significant wealth.  But the way this wealth is created is
different from the ways of the quid pro quo economy.”  Lessig, supra at 16.
68 See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS
OF MORE 73–74 (2008).
69 Free software is characterized by the fact that the underlying source code is made avail-
able to the public.  Some free software is also “copylefted,” in that it incorporates license
restrictions designed to ensure that anyone who uses the software code must release any new
software under copyleft’s permissive terms. See Severine Dusollier, Open Source and Copy-
right: Authorship Reconsidered?, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 281, 282–88 (2003).
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tensive enterprise.70  For open source software developers, monetary rewards
are often secondary to the improved reputation they receive within their peer
communities.71
To many economists, open source software development makes no
sense because it relies on the irrational and altruistic behavior of volunteers
who give away valuable code, reveal proprietary information, and help
strangers solve their software problems.72  Yet open source development,
which involves the voluntary contributions of thousands of programmers,
most of whom have never met each other, “can produce more reliable and
robust software than that produced by commercial enterprises.”73  To be suc-
cessful, the open source software movement has leveraged the Internet’s fa-
cilitation of high-bandwidth communication and distributed computing.
Equally important, open source software developers have created sophisti-
cated systems for building trust among disparate contributors.  They have
done this by creating protocols that leverage reputation, allowing other de-
velopers to evaluate contributors and the pieces of software they create.74
While noncommercial economies are not unique to the Internet, the In-
ternet has allowed them to expand in ways that would have been impossible
when physical geography set the limits on our ability to interact with others.
Indeed, the Internet’s facilitation of near-instantaneous worldwide communi-
cation can be likened to the impact that some theorists believe language has
had on cooperative endeavors where knowledge of trustworthiness is essen-
tial.75  Like human language, the communicative aspects of the Internet un-
lock the power of reputation in dispersed communities and are creating
highly efficient systems for using reputational information to address real
world problems.
70 Examples of successful open source software include the Linux operating system,
Apache web server, PHP programming language, and Firefox browser. Although a compli-
cated set of motivations exist in free/open source software communities, one of the important
motivations is reputation. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 141–42 (2005).
While many software developers expend time and resources to develop software because they
are interested in fixing a problem or addressing a need that they are themselves experiencing.
Yet they share their work with the world—without compensation—because of the “kudos that
flows to the programmer from others in his community.”  Lessig, supra note 67, at 16. R
71 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 70, at 141; Andrea Bonaccorsi and Cristina Rossi, Altruis- R
tic Individuals, Selfish Firms? The Structure of Motivation in Open Source Software, 9 FIRST
MONDAY 1 (2004), http://www.firstmonday.org/nthin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/vi
ew/1113/1033.
72 See Josh Lerner & Jean Triole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 52 J. INDUS.
ECON. 197, 197–99 (2002).
73 CLIPPINGER, supra note 35, at 121. R
74 Id. at 122 (concluding that the “success of the open source movement has been pro-
pelled by the power of peer review, which is achieved through the same combination of visi-
bility, ratings, and accountability that worked for eBay”).
75 See supra note 22. R
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 15  8-OCT-10 15:13
2010] Reputation in a Networked World 275
B. Virtual Communities: Real Reputations
We also see the powerful role that reputation can play in the develop-
ment of virtual communities that mimic community life in the corporeal
world.  One such virtual community is Second Life, a persistent three-di-
mensional virtual world on the Internet that boasts several million registered
users.76  Users of the service, which are called “residents,” are encouraged
to change and develop their appearance and identity, build their own virtual
domiciles, acquire personal items, and collaborate with each other.77
Users of Second Life create pseudonymous identities and interact with
each other through “avatars” that include associated profiles containing,
among other things, biographical information, group affiliations, interests,
and ratings given by other users.  Originally Second Life had a rating system
that allowed users to rate others in one of three categories:  overall behavior,
skill at appearance, and skill at building.78  Users paid a small fee for each
rating they gave and could leave a short message accompanying the rating.79
This system was later replaced with a system that allows third-party software
developers to create reputation tools that Second Life users can implement in
the virtual world.80  While ratings have no functional effect, they are an im-
portant determinate of social status within Second Life’s virtual world.81
As these community rating systems become more complex, they ap-
proximate the way reputation is used in everyday life.  It is natural, however,
to discount the pseudonymous reputation systems in place in Second Life by
assuming they have no relevance to the corporeal world.  But substantial real
76 See http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-data.php  (real time user metrics for Sec-
ond Life).  The number of active users is estimated to be quite small; in 2007 when Second
Life stated that it had five million members, others estimated the actual number at 250,000.
See Clay Shirky, Real Second Life Numbers, Thanks to David Kirkpatrick, CORANTE (Jan.
4, 2007), http://many.corante.com/archives/2007/01/04/real_second_life_numbers_thanks_to_
david_kirkpatrick.php.  Although information on the demographics of Second Life’s users is
scant, it is believed that twenty-five percent to forty-five percent of users come from outside
the United States, mostly from Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Western Europe.
See Fiend Ludwig, In the Metaverse, No One Can Hear Your Accent, SECOND LIFE HERALD,
May 26, 2006, http://www.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2006/05/in_the_metavers.html.
77 Andrew Herman et al., Your Second Life? Goodwill and the Performativity of Intellec-
tual Property in Online Digital Gaming, 20 CULTURAL STUD. 184, 196 (2006).
78 Posting of Jeska Linden to Second Life Blogs, Removal of Ratings in Beta, https://
blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2007/04/12/removal-of-ratings-in-beta (Apr.
12, 2007, 19:27 EST).
79 Posting of Akela Talamasca to Second Life Insider, Just Askin’: How Useful is a Repu-
tation System?, http://www.secondlifeinsider.com/2006/12/12/just-askin-how-useful-is-a-repu-
tation-system/ (Dec. 12, 2006, 17:45 EST).
80 Posting of Jeska Linden to Second Life Blogs, Removal of Ratings in Beta https://
blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2007/04/12/removal-of-ratings-in-beta (Apr.
12, 2007, 19:27 EST).
81 See Matt McKeon and Susan Wyche, Life Across Boundaries: Design, Identity, and
Gender in SL 15 (2005), http://www.mattmckeon.com/portfolio/second-life.pdf.  Researchers
at the Georgia Institute of Technology examined the social structure within Second Life and
found “four axes of social status, along which residents may occupy different positions: citi-
zenship, wealth, reputation, and building.” Id. at 13.
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world dollars flow through these online worlds,82 and in the case of Second
Life, established businesses rushed to open virtual stores in order to cash
in.83  For some people, their virtual reputations are as important as their cor-
poreal reputations, especially participants who use these virtual worlds to
sell goods and services.84  Moreover, many participants in these online
worlds consider their activities within the virtual space as creative work, not
simply leisurely play, and many are “happy to make such play a big part of
their life work.”85
These virtual communities clearly show the emergent nature of reputa-
tion.86  Indeed, in the online context, identity is often determined by reputa-
tion tags:  “Who you are in many networked environments depends on how
others see and rate you.”87  As a consequence, reputation can take on added
importance in online communities where individuals must rely on reputation
signals to decide with whom to interact.
The sense of presence experienced by those who participate in these
virtual worlds makes them feel more real than other forms of electronic
communication; therefore their experiences in virtual worlds can be more
important to self-identity and reputation than in previous forms of mediated
communication.88  This phenomenon should not be surprising.  As Goffman
observed in 1959, in face-to-face encounters much information about the self
is communicated—often involuntarily—in ways incidental to the main pur-
pose of the interaction.89  This depth and richness is lacking in most online
encounters, but the problem of communicating an identity remains.  The
three-dimensional nature of virtual worlds helps to rectify this deficiency by
82 Overall, participants spend a total of $880 million a year for virtual goods and services
produced in online games, according to Steve Salyer, president of Internet Gaming Entertain-
ment.  Mark Wallace, The Game is Virtual. The Profit is Real, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 7.
83 “In the past year, dozens of companies have bought land, launched businesses and
started marketing campaigns in Second Life, including IBM, Dell, CBS, NBC and Toyota.”
L.A. Lorek, Real Money in a Virtual World, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 20, 2007, at
1E.
84 A thirty-one-year-old user of Cyworld (a Korean social networking site) quit her job
and opened an online shopping site after the collection of dolls and clothes she showed on her
Cyworld “home page” drew 2.7 million visitors. E-Society: My World Is Cyworld, BUSINESS-
WEEK ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_39/
b3952405.htm.
85 Herman et al., supra note 77, at 188.  For some sociologists, this phenomenon has nega- R
tive repercussions.  Aaron Wittel has opined that personal and social identity is increasingly
becoming dislodged from the traditional loci of social interaction, such as family and work,
and progressively embedded in the medium of information networks.  Aaron Wittel, Toward a
Network Sociality, 18 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 51 (2001).
86 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 386 (2009); Susan Craw-
ford, Who’s In Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 211,
214 (2004) (noting that in the identity context “[w]hat is interesting and new about virtual
worlds is that they make this group-shaping explicit”).
87 CLIPPINGER, supra note 35, at 92. R
88 See RICHARD BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS 159 (2003) (“The celebration of
identity is the fundamental, critical, absolutely core point of virtual worlds.”).
89 GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 208.
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creating personal avatars and environments that echo the corporeal world
and provide visual, as well as other, signals of a user’s reputation.90
As more and more activity is conducted on the Internet, reputation will
further increase in importance as a means of communicating complex social
information.  Formal reputation systems allow reputation to be defined and
measured precisely, if not always fairly or accurately, by the opinions and
actions of others.  As reputation systems become prevalent in virtual and
social networking spaces, distinctions between the real and virtual world will
further blur.91
III. EXISTING LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE PROTECTION OF REPUTATION
As the preceding sections illustrate, reputational information is con-
stantly being created and spread through our interactions with others.  The
common law interposes itself across this flow of information in three pri-
mary ways: through defamation law, privacy law, and a form of privacy and
intellectual property hybrid called misappropriation.92  Although the latter
two doctrines are not intended to protect reputation per se, the types of harm
they redress often have just as deleterious effects on reputation as defama-
tory falsehoods.93  Indeed, the Ron Livingston lawsuit, discussed throughout
this article, includes claims for false light invasion of privacy and misappro-
priation of name and likeness in addition to defamation.94
The focus of this article is on defamation, the branch of tort law most
directly concerned with protecting reputation.  As a product of state law, the
precise contours of the tort95 will vary from state to state.  Generally speak-
ing, however, a cause of action for defamation requires:  (1) a false and
90 Following on Erving Goffman’s insights, Hugh Miller notes that “as the culture of elec-
tronic communication develops, people will construct expressive resources out of whatever
facilities are available.  Electronic communication will become more and more human com-
munication to the extent that there is more to it than just efficiently passing information to each
other.”  Hugh Miller, The Presentation of Self in Electronic Life: Goffman on the Internet
(paper presented at Embodied Knowledge and Virtual Space conference, Goldsmiths’ College,
University of London, June 1995), http://www.ntu.ac.uk/soc/psych/miller/goffman.htm.
91 Crawford, supra note 26, at 211 (2004) (predicting that “[s]omeday ‘virtual world’
identities will be indistinguishable from ‘real’ identities—just as ‘e-commerce’ has become
indistinguishable from ‘commerce’”).
92 See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.  The law also seeks to protect and
regulate reputation through various statutory approaches, including the Fair Credit Reporting
Act and Lanham Act.  Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693); Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat.
427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n).  The focus of this article is on
the legal protections afforded to individuals through the common law, particularly defamation
law.
93 See infra Part IV.A.
94 See Coupleguys, Inc. v. John Doe, No. BC-427389 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 4, 2009).
95 Defamation law actually comprises two torts:  libel and slander.  Libel covers defama-
tory statements that are written or communicated in such a way that they persist similar to the
printed word; slander generally covers defamatory statements published orally or in a manner
that is not likely to be preserved in a physical form or broadcast widely. See ROBERT D. SACK,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 43–45, 96–98 (1980).
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defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged communica-
tion of that statement to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negli-
gence on the part of the speaker; and (4) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm (per se) or the existence of special harm caused
by the publication (per quod).96
The sine qua non of defamation is a false statement of fact.97  State-
ments of opinion typically cannot support a cause of action for defamation,
even if they are outrageous or widely off the mark.98  Defamation law also
does not permit recovery for the exposure of private but truthful informa-
tion,99 or for false communications that may hurt an individual’s feelings but
do not cause reputational harm.  The four privacy torts—false light, unrea-
sonable intrusion into seclusion, unreasonable publication of private facts,
and misappropriation of one’s name or likeness—developed to provide a
remedy in such situations.100  Although these torts do not require a plaintiff
to allege reputational harm, as defamation law does, they permit individuals
to protect the manner in which they are exposed to the world and therefore
the way in which they are perceived by others.101
All of the privacy torts are based on the right to lead a life outside of
prying eyes and ears,102 although the last of the four—misappropriation—is
often considered to be more about protecting an individual’s property interest
than privacy interests.103  The privacy tort that comes closest to protecting
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
97 Ardia, supra note 50, at 45. R
98 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990); Leidholdt v.
L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1988).
99 See, e.g., Campanelli v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 891, 896 (Ct. App.
1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). But see Noonan v. Staples, Inc.,
556 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that truthful speech on a matter of private concern can
create liability under Massachusetts law if published with actual malice).
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
101 Courts first began to recognize the privacy torts after Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis published The Right to Privacy in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.  4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).  In their article, Warren and Brandeis expressed concern over the increasingly sensa-
tionalist press that was “overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
decency,” and noted that various technological developments—particularly “instantaneous
photography”—posed a grave threat to privacy. Id. at 196.  The notion of a privacy tort was
first accepted by Georgia, see Pasevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 58 (Ga. 1905),
and gradually gained recognition in most states.
102 The privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion demonstrates this most clearly.  It is de-
fined as the intentional intrusion, “physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).  Unlike defamation, false light, and public disclosure of
private facts, publication is not an element of intrusion.  Intrusion covers some activities also
prohibited by other laws, such as laws against trespass, wiretapping, and breaking and enter-
ing, but also includes things like surveillance in public that frightens or torments the plaintiff.
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding intrusion claim brought by Jacque-
line Onassis against a photographer who had been hounding her and her children).
103 Misappropriation, which varies widely from state to state, is defined in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, as subjecting a person to liability if he “appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
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reputational interests is the tort of public disclosure of private facts.  The
Restatement defines this tort in the following manner:  “One who gives pub-
licity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of privacy if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not of legiti-
mate concern to the public.”104
One of the elements distinguishing a publication of private facts claim
from a defamation claim is that truth is not a defense; instead, truth of the
challenged communication is an essential element of the tort.  An individual
has no claim for publication of private facts if the publication is false.105  In
addition, the disclosed information must be private.106  Information that is a
matter of public record cannot be the basis for a claim,107 and anything that
occurs in a public place is by definition not private and cannot be the subject
of a cause of action.108
The privacy tort that is most similar to defamation is called “false
light.”  A claim for false light will exist when one gives publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light,
Although the origins of this tort arose out of concern for the emotional distress and loss of
dignity an individual might suffer when his name or likeness is used without his permission, it
has come to be seen as more of a way of protecting an individual’s property interests in her
identity. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) (arguing that the
interest the misappropriation tort protects is “not so much mental as a propriety one”); Daniel
Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 546–47 (2006).  As a result, in some
states plaintiffs can recover under a misappropriation theory only if they can demonstrate some
commercial value in their name or likeness. See, e.g., Barnako v. Foto Kirsch, Ltd., 13 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2373 (D.D.C. 1987) (prohibiting recovery in a case where a photography studio
used a picture it had taken of the plaintiff in promotional materials).  Other courts recognize
that misappropriation claims can provide relief for both mental distress and for lost profits
resulting from unauthorized use of a plaintiff’s name or likeness. See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 753 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
105 See, e.g., Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 242 (1986).
106 See, e.g., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808 (1998).
107 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that the accurate identifica-
tion of a rape victim’s name that was inadvertently revealed in a sheriff’s press office was
protected under the First Amendment); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (re-
jecting claim based on publication of name of rape victim contained in public court
documents).
108 Rare exceptions to this rule have been made in situations where a private person has
been caught in a very embarrassing event outside of her control. See Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (allowing a woman to recover for a published picture of
her emerging from a fun house where a fan had blown up her skirt without her knowledge).
But many courts have refused to recognize an exception in similar contexts. See, e.g., Neff v.
Time, 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802
S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App. 1991).  In an effort to square the publication of private facts tort with
the First Amendment, courts also require that the matter disclosed cannot be “newsworthy.”
See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484-85 (Cal. 1998).  In making this
determination, judges have expressed concern that it is improper for a court to determine what
is newsworthy, see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), particularly
when they are asked to second guess a media defendant, Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485 (rejecting
public disclosure claim based on broadcast of pictures of plaintiff receiving medical attention
at accident scene).
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provided that the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.109  This tort compensates for subjective,
emotional injury, and not injury to reputation.110  Because defamation and
false light invasion of privacy are similar, plaintiffs often assert claims for
both defamation and false light.111  As a result, courts concerned with plain-
tiffs doing an end-run around the fault requirements of New York Times v.
Sullivan (discussed in the following section) and its progeny typically re-
quire the same level of fault in a false light claim as would be required for a
defamation claim.112
A. The Uneasy Truce Between Defamation and the First Amendment
One of the most challenging—and interesting—aspects of defamation
law is that it deals with the clash of two important, but admittedly ambigu-
ous, societal values:  freedom of speech and the protection of reputation.
Defamation law does not impose liability for every lie that harms reputation.
That would be unworkable.  The law must draw lines, which it does by de-
fining defamatory speech.  But as the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted,
even false speech can have value.
Until the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan113 in 1964,
it was assumed that defamation law existed outside the scope of the First
Amendment.  In Sullivan, however, the Court “constitutionalized” defama-
tion law by proclaiming that even false defamatory speech was deserving of
some First Amendment protection.114  The Court was concerned that public
officials could stifle free debate by bringing defamation actions against their
critics, much as they had stifled debate using the Sedition Act of 1798.  The
Court explained that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’” 115
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  Not all states recognize the tort of
false light.
110 Actionable statements under a false light theory include those that may not be defama-
tory but falsely represent a person’s characteristics, conduct, or beliefs. Id.
111 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 12.3.7 (3d ed. 2007).  Several states have
refused to recognize the false light tort because it is too similar to defamation. See, e.g.,
Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp.2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582
N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (Minn. 1998); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405,
412 (N.C. 1984).
112 SACK, supra note 111, § 12.3; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).  Be-
cause Time, Inc. was decided before Gertz, when the Court held that actual malice is required
in cases involving matters of public concern when a public official or public figure is the
plaintiff, some courts have held that the actual malice standard applies in a false light case only
when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1984).
113 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
114 Id. at 273.
115 Id. at 271–72.
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Although the Court recognized the importance of tolerating some false
speech in order to ensure a full and vigorous public debate, it was unwilling
to hold that false defamatory speech was unconditionally and absolutely
privileged under the First Amendment.116  Instead, the Court declared that
public officials bringing defamation claims had to demonstrate that the de-
fendant published the challenged statements about her with “actual mal-
ice.”117  This fault standard represents the Court’s attempt to balance the
value of robust public debate with the reputational harm to public officials
that such debate might bring.
In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to struggle in striking the
right balance between vigorous debate and the protection of reputation.  In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court made explicit its attempts to balance
uninhibited public debate and “the compensation of individuals for the harm
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.”118  In striking this balance, the
Court held that private figures involved in matters of public concern did not
need to demonstrate actual malice to recover actual damages, although they
still needed to prove a high level of fault in order to recover punitive or
presumed damages.119
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court
shifted the balance closer to the protection of reputational interests when the
plaintiff is a private figure and the challenged statements involve a matter of
private concern.120  A divided Court concluded that in such cases, the plain-
tiff need not demonstrate actual malice to recover any sort of damages.  In
reaching this conclusion, the plurality explained that speech that does not
concern matters of public concern is not at the “core” of the First
Amendment.121
B. The Social Foundations of Defamation Law
The balancing metaphor alluded to in the Court’s decisions addressing
the constitutionally permissible scope of defamation law suggests that the
nature of reputation and the state’s interest in its protection are self evident
and universally understood.122  But this is not the situation at all.  In fact,
courts engage in “relatively little discussion of the nature and importance of
116 This contrasts sharply with the absolutist views of Justices Black and Douglas, who
concurred with the result in New York Times v. Sullivan. See id. at 295–96 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. at 282–83.
118 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
119 Id. at 349.
120 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
121 Id. at 760.
122 As Professor Post observes, “[i]t is all too easy to assume that everyone knows the
value of reputation, and to let the matter drop with the obligatory reference to Shakespeare’s
characterization of a ‘good name’ as the ‘immediate jewel’ of the soul.”  Post, supra note 7, at R
692 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act III, scene iii).
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‘the State’s interest’ in protecting reputation,” as that would require an “ex-
ploration into the obscure purposes and functions of [the] common law.”123
As a result, courts typically do not undertake the difficult task of defining
reputation,124 choosing instead to delineate categories of reputational harm
and “right thinking” communities that defamation law will recognize.
We see this most clearly in defamation law’s threshold inquiry:  whether
a given communication is defamatory.  Given that the gravamen of a defa-
mation claim is injury to reputation, it would seem logical to assume that a
false statement would be actionable “whenever the plaintiff’s reputation has
been [harmed], even in the extreme case where the esteem lost be that of
but one man, and he a moron, a lunatic, or a murderer.”125  This, however,
has never been the case for the law of defamation because courts long ago
developed doctrinal limitations that “curtail the operation of the basic policy
of defamation law.”126
We see these doctrinal limitations operating in two areas of defamation
law that are the focus of this article.  First, courts must determine whether
the meaning conveyed by the speech at issue has the tendency to harm an
interest in reputation that the law will recognize.  Second, in assessing
whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, courts must deter-
mine the appropriate and proper community in whose esteem the plaintiff
has been harmed.  Both of these inquires require a court to make assump-
tions about how society is, or should be, structured and the nature of social
interactions.
The first of these threshold inquiries—whether the allegedly defama-
tory speech has the tendency to harm an interest in reputation that the law
will recognize—is addressed in this section.  A discussion of the challenges
associated with defining the appropriate community in whose esteem the
plaintiff has been harmed follows in Part III.C.
1. The Social Construction of Reputational Harm
In deciding whether a given statement is defamatory, courts ask
whether the statement at issue would be likely to elicit certain specific re-
sponses from others.127  Although the precise contours of this element of a
123 Post, supra note 7, at 692. R
124 Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 877 (1956) (noting
that “courts have not attempted to define reputation as an abstract entity”).
125 Note, The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Dissenting Essay, 58 YALE
L.J. 1387, 1390 (1949) [hereinafter The Community Segment in Defamation Actions].
126 Id. at 1390.
127 The Community Segment in Defamation Actions, supra note 125, at 1390.  This re-
quires the court to undertake both a linguistic inquiry to determine the “tendencies” of the
words at issue, see Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation:
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 828 (1984), and a sociological inquiry
to determine the nature of the reputational harm occasioned by those words. See infra Part
III.C.  Although a jury must decide the ultimate question of whether a plaintiff has been de-
famed, it is the duty of the court to determine “whether the statement alleged to have caused
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-OCT-10 15:13
2010] Reputation in a Networked World 283
defamation claim vary from state to state, there is universal agreement that
expression that is merely unflattering, annoying, irksome, embarrassing, or
which simply hurts the plaintiff’s feelings is not actionable.128  New York, for
example, defines a defamatory publication as one that “tends to expose the
plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an evil
opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of
their friendly intercourse in society.”129
Unlike other torts,130 defamation law is not concerned primarily with
the impact of the defendant’s statement on the plaintiff,131 but rather with the
impact of the statement on those who make up the plaintiff’s “commu-
nity.”132  Moreover, it is important to note that it is not necessary that the
statement actually cause harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.133  It is enough if
the statement has the general tendency to cause harm.134  Because a state-
ment’s defamatory character turns on “the opinion which others in the com-
munity may have, or tend to have,”135 it is by necessity socially constructed.
Defamation law does not, however, protect against all such harms to
reputation.  It recognizes some harms and ignores others; in doing so, it ele-
vates some interests over others.136  In his seminal work describing the social
foundations of defamation law, Professor Robert Post identified three largely
distinct conceptions of reputation in the common law:  reputation as prop-
erty, honor, and dignity.137  By examining how defamation law defines and
advances these interests, we gain considerable insight into the assumptions
the law embodies about the structure of society and how defamation law
operates in our increasingly networked world.
plaintiff an injury is reasonably susceptible to the defamatory meaning imputed to it.”  Levin
v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1997).  In this analysis, the court must consider both
the “meaning of the words as they would be commonly understood” as well as the context in
which they appear. Id.
128 SACK, supra note 111, § 2.4.1.
129 Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744, 751 (1996).
130 There are a few exceptions, including tortious interference which is sometimes de-
scribed as tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
131 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at
771 (observing that common law defamation is “not concerned with the plaintiff’s own humili-
ation, wrath or sorrow, except as an element of ‘parasitic’ damages attached to an independent
cause of action”); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the Ameri-
can Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983) (noting that “defamation does not provide
compensation for emotional disturbance, but rather remedies a wrongful disruption in the ‘re-
lational interest’ that an individual has in maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others”).
132 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 6. R
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1977).  This is because of defamation
law’s doctrine of presumed harm. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
134 Id.
135 KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, at 771.
136 See infra notes 142 and accompanying text.
137 See Post, supra note 7, at 693–719.  As Professor Post conceded in 1986, other concep- R
tions of reputation exist, but the three concepts enumerated in the text “have been most influ-
ential in the development of common law defamation.” Id. at 720.
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a. Reputation as Honor
The view of reputation as a form of personal honor is perhaps the oldest
conception of reputation evident in the law of defamation, which saw its
genesis in feudal England.138  Honor in this context is “defined as a form of
reputation in which an individual personally identifies with the normative
characteristics of a particular social role and in return personally receives
from others the regard and estimation that society accords to that role.”139
While an individual can lose honor, he cannot earn it “through effort or
labor; he claims a right to it by virtue of the status with which society en-
dows his social role.”140
We see this conception of reputation most clearly in defamation law’s
imposition of presumed damages.  Under this “anomalous doctrine,”141 a
plaintiff may recover damages without proof of actual harm.142  A court sim-
ply asks whether the statement has the tendency to cause the type of harm to
reputation the law will protect.  The doctrine of presumed damages is poten-
tially available in every libel case.143  In contrast, in slander cases, a plaintiff
must prove actual harm, called “special damages,” unless the communica-
tion falls into one of the enumerated categories of slander per se, which
generally involve the imputation of a crime, of a loathsome disease, of prac-
tices or conditions that harm the plaintiff in his trade, profession, or busi-
ness, or of serious sexual misconduct.144  The fact that the presumption of
damages operates even if the defendant proves that the plaintiff has suffered
no harm,145 suggests that courts are protecting a reputational interest akin to
honor.146
138 See Pat O’Malley, From Feudal Honour to Bourgeouis Reputation: Ideology, Law and
the Rise of Industrial Capitalism, 15 SOC. 79 (1981).
139 Post, supra note 7, at 699–700. R
140 Post, supra note 7, at 700 (citing Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR R
AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 21–22, 35 (J. G. Peristiany ed., 1966)).
141 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 6 n.20; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, R
349 (1974) (describing “the common law of defamation [as] an oddity of tort law, for it
allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss”).  In
fact, “[d]efamation is the only tort that allows substantial recovery without proof of injury.”
David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 748
(1984).
142 See Anderson, supra note 141, at 748–52.  The “special harm” that a plaintiff must
show in a libel per quod case is merely a pleading requirement, not a limitation on recovery.
Id. at 748.  “In those cases, the plaintiff has no cause of action without proof of special dam-
age.  Once the plaintiff proves special damage, however, he is entitled not only to those dam-
ages, but to presumed damages as well.” Id.
143 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 6 n.20. R
144 Id.
145 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1977).
146 Post, supra note 7, at 698.  In fact, historically the law of defamation has taken its role R
of protecting honor so seriously that truth or falsity was deemed immaterial for purposes of
criminal libel; ‘“the greater the truth, the greater the libel.”  David Riesman, Democracy and
Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 735 (1942).
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The view of reputation as honor also sets the limit on what types of
statements the law will find defamatory.  In other words, a plaintiff who has
suffered actual harm within her community may still be precluded from us-
ing the law of defamation to vindicate her reputation if the statements at
issue do not have a tendency to impugn certain personal characteristics.147
For example, a false statement that an individual is dead will surely damage
the individual’s credit or business opportunities, but it will not support a
defamation claim.148  The fact that defamation law “leave[s] some actual
injuries inexplicably uncompensated, can be conceptualized as a method of
distinguishing between those communications that are relevant to the ques-
tion of honor, and those that are not.”149
Defamation law’s conception of reputation as honor assumes that soci-
ety is hierarchical and structured around clearly defined—and largely immu-
table—social roles.  It also assumes that individuals and their social roles are
interdependent.150  That is, individuals can only be understood with regard to
their place in the social hierarchy.  But that is an archaic—and un-Ameri-
can—view of society.151  As our society has become more networked, the
idea that individuals exist within a hierarchical structure of rigidly defined
social roles seems increasingly anachronistic.152  Of course, in some profes-
sions, such as the military, personal honor still plays an important role.153
But it certainly is not the case on the Internet, where there is truth to the
adage captured in Peter Steiner’s familiar cartoon in The New Yorker:  “On
the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”154
147 These personal characteristics generally fall into such categories as criminality, integ-
rity, honesty, and competence, as well as physical and mental attributes such as disease or
insanity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
148 See, e.g., O’Neill v. Edmonds, 157 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Va. 1958); Thomason v. Times-
Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. App. 1989); Cohen v. New York Times Co., 153 A.D.
242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
149 Post, supra note 7, at 706. R
150 Id.
151 Alexis de Tocqueville, noting Americans’ disdain for honor, wrote that “the dissimilari-
ties and inequalities of men gave rise to the notion of honor; that notion is weakened in propor-
tion as these differences are obliterated, and with them it would disappear.” ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA Vol. II 255 (H. Reeve trans. 1945).
152 See Barry Wellman et al., The Social Affordances of the Internet for Networked Indi-
vidualism, 3 J. COMP. MEDIATED COMM. 8 (2003) (“Communities and societies have been
changing towards networked societies where boundaries are more permeable, interactions are
with diverse others, linkages switch between multiple networks, and hierarchies are flatter and
more recursive.”).
153 See Volker C. Franke, Duty, Honor, Country: The Social Identity of West Point Cadets,
26 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 175 (2000).  In other professions, such as medicine, there are still
those who seem eager to impose restrictions on speech that would grant them honorific status.
See Jeffrey Segal et al., Legal Remedies for Online Defamation of Physicians, 30 J. LEGAL
MED. 349, 374 (2009) (suggesting that doctors should have their patients sign “contracts pur-
porting to limit, through mutual agreement, the patient’s physician-rating commentary on the
Internet”).
154 Peter Steiner, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.  Thought to capture of
the spirit of the Internet, see Glenn Fleishman, Cartoon Captures Spirit of the Internet,  N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at G8, Steiner’s cartoon has been understood to convey that “cyberspace
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b. Reputation as Dignity
A second influential strain that runs through defamation law is the view
of reputation as dignity.  Under this conception of reputation, “[t]he dignity
that defamation law protects is . . . the respect (and self-respect) that arises
from full membership in society.”155  Membership in society is typically es-
tablished through “rules of civility” that define and maintain an individual’s
dignity.156  While the concept of reputation as dignity is similar to the con-
cept of reputation as honor, “dignity is concerned with the aspects of per-
sonal identity that stem from membership in the general community.”157  By
contrast, “honor is concerned with the relationship between attributes of per-
sonal identity that stem from the characteristics of particular social roles.”158
The conception of reputation as dignity has been enormously influential
both inside and outside the courtroom.  We understand intuitively that the
opinions of others play a role in defining us.159  The philosopher Jean-Jac-
ques Rousseau believed that no sooner did humankind emerge from the
“state of nature” into communal existence than our need for reputation took
hold:  “Man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in
the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his
own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him.”160
The sociologist Erving Goffman offers an explanation for how the per-
ceptions of others influence our self-identity.  According to Goffman, iden-
tity is continuously being constituted through social interactions.161  “Rules
of conduct . . . bind the actor and the recipient together” and “are the bind-
ings of society.”162  By following socially established rules of deference and
demeanor, “individuals both confirm the social order in which they live and
will be liberatory because gender, race, age, looks, or even ‘dogness’ are potentially absent or
alternatively fabricated or exaggerated with unchecked creative license.” TIM JORDAN, THE
CULTURE AND POLITICS OF CYBERSPACE AND THE INTERNET 66 (1999).
155 Post, supra note 7, at 711. R
156 Post, supra note 7, at 711 (observing that “[p]ersons who are socially acceptable will R
be included within the forms of respect that constitute social dignity; persons who are stigma-
tized as deviants will be excluded”).
157 Post, supra note 7, at 715. R
158 Id.
159 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 243 (1974) (“People gener-
ally judge themselves by how they fall along the most important dimensions in which they
differ from others.”); Crawford, supra note 26, at 213 (stating that “[i]dentity and reputation
go hand in hand, as individuals gain reputations that are connected to particular contexts and
groups”); Solove, supra note 103, at 551 (noting that “[t]hroughout most of western history,
one’s reputation and character have been viewed as indispensable to self-identity and the abil-
ity to engage in public life”).
160 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE SOCIAL CON-
TRACT AND DISCOURSES 237 (G. Cole, trans. 1935); see also JOHN CHARVET, THE SOCIAL
PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU 26 (1974) (stating that “[w]hat Rousseau seems
to be saying is that . . . these comparative evaluations create in men a desire to be distinguished
in the opinions of others and thus at the same time both a concern for their relative status and a
dependence for their self-identity on how they exist in the eyes of others”).
161 ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 84–85 (1967).
162 Id. at 90.
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constitute ‘ritual’ and ‘sacred’ aspects of their own identity.”163  As a result,
each “individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which
he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts.”164
The conception of reputation as dignity also has been extremely influ-
ential on the courts.  Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s concurring opin-
ion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, in which the defendant falsely implied that the
plaintiff had engaged in financial mismanagement at a publicly owned ski
resort, captures this view of reputation:  “The right of a man to the protec-
tion of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt re-
flects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being.”165  While the majority in Rosenblatt did not adopt Jus-
tice Stewart’s description of the reputational interest at issue in the case, his
characterization of the interest has been quoted with great frequency by
other courts.166
Yet the view of reputation as dignity transcends the interests of the indi-
vidual, as civility rules also function as a means of defining and maintaining
a community’s boundaries.167  While individual identity is constituted by
identification with the community and internalization of its rules and values,
“the community, in turn, is constituted by the shared values of individuals,
and the community depends for its continued existence on the ‘reciprocal
observance’ of the ‘rules of civility’ that it has prescribed.”168  As Professor
Post notes:
Implicit in the concept of reputation as dignity, therefore, is the
potential for a dual function for defamation law:  the protection of
an individual’s interest in dignity, which is to say his interest in
being included within the forms of social respect; and the enforce-
ment of society’s interest in its rules of civility, which is to say its
interest in defining and maintaining the contours of its own social
constitution.169
163 Post, supra note 7, at 708 (quoting GOFFMAN, supra note 34, at 91). R
164 GOFFMAN, supra note 34, at 84–85 (“While it may be true that the individual has a R
unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial
labor, the part expressed through the individual’s demeanor being no more significant than the
part conveyed by others through their deferential behavior toward him.”).
165 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
166 See, e.g., Kanaga v. Gannet Co., Inc., 687 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1996); Journal-Gazette
Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 475 (Ind. 1999); Stone v. Essex County Newspa-
pers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 168 (Mass. 1975); Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367
N.W.2d 476, 483 (Minn. 1985); Canino v. N.Y. News, Inc., 475 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. 1984);
Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 395 (Pa. 2007).
167 Post, supra note 7, at 711 (“The maintenance of such social boundaries is an important R
method by which societies ‘develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity’ and hence
preserve ‘the stability of social life.’” (quoting K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 13 (1966))).  The role that defamation law plays in defining and
maintaining community is discussed infra in Part III.C.
168 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 37 (quoting Post, supra note 7, at 716). R
169 Post, supra note 7, at 711.  Gossip has traditionally been one of the ways by which R
communities informally enforce social norms. See Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavy-
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This raises two difficult questions for courts tasked with determining
whether a plaintiff has made out a viable defamation claim.  Modern socie-
ties are made up of multiple “communities” with differing norms and rules
of civility.170  How should a court determine which community’s norms gov-
ern the claim?  Moreover, how should a court go about identifying the rele-
vant norms and determining whether they should be enforced through the
judicial application of defamation law?  Neither task is amenable to objec-
tive measurement as they are both freighted with normative judgments about
how society is, or should be, constituted.
In deciding which norms to enforce, a court necessarily advances some
interests over others.  Defamation law can enforce only a small subset of a
community’s norms.  In addition to ensuring that courts are not inundated
with trivial lawsuits, this limitation “preserves the flexibility and vitality of
social life, which undoubtedly would be hardened and otherwise altered for
the worse if every indiscretion could be transformed into formal legal
action.”171
Defamation law does this, as an initial matter, by requiring that a
breach of civility be accompanied by “publication to a third party.”172  It
also seeks to enforce only the most important breaches of civility by limiting
the tort to statements that “tend[ ] to expose the plaintiff to public contempt,
ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds
of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in
society,”173 an admittedly ambiguous and less than helpful guide for
courts.174
Surprisingly, defamation doctrines “presuppose[ ] that identification of
a community’s rules of civility is a relatively straight-forward task and that
the ‘community’ whose ‘rules’ the law is assigned to police is an organized,
cohesive unit.”175  But civility rules change over time and often vary be-
weight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 326–37
(1983).
170 See infra Part III.C.
171 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Com-
mon Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 975 (1989).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(b) (1977).  Interestingly, the requirement that
the communication be published to a third party has not always been an element of a defama-
tion claim. See THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 483–84
(5th ed. 2001) (noting that early English common law “was particularly concerned with insult-
ing words addressed by one person to another”).
173 Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744 (1996).
174 The definition included in the Restatement is even less helpful:  “A communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).  Not surprisingly, “variations among definitions of defama-
tion have little apparent effect on the actual outcome of cases.” ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA
S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 74 (2d ed. 1994).  Instead, case outcomes
are “far more likely to reflect different social circumstances.” Id.
175 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 38. R
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tween individuals, even within established communities.176  Furthermore, be-
cause defamation law takes as a given that members of a community define
the community’s civility rules through their shared adoption of those rules,
when community membership changes rapidly it stands to reason that the
community’s civility rules will be in flux.177
We see this phenomenon play out with remarkable frequency on the
Internet, where community boundaries are porous and community composi-
tion faces few constraints.178  A fascinating example is Usenet, one of the
first distributed Internet discussion systems, which is “policed” through a
set of loosely articulated norms that a new user is expected to read and un-
derstand.179  As new users flow in and community composition changes
within the many Usenet discussion groups, rules of civility are constantly
being constituted and reconstituted, often through “flame wars.”180
As the preceding discussion shows, the concept of reputation as dignity
rests on an idealized view of society that sees communities as relatively
homogenous and static, and in which there has been a general diffusion of
shared social norms.  Indeed this view is so ingrained that “[j]udges often
seem to assume that in run-of-the-mill defamation cases, the existence of a
general consensus of opinion in the community is so obvious that it merely
takes common sense to discover it.”181  While this may have been true when
most of the human population lived in widely-dispersed rural villages, it is
certainly no longer an accurate view of our modern networked society.182
176 To see this change play out in the case law, one need look no further than the decisions
addressing the question of whether it is defamatory to state that someone is a communist in the
first half of the twentieth century.  The Red Scare of the 1920s produced several decisions
holding that such a charge was defamatory per se. See, e.g., Washington Times Co. v. Murray,
299 Fed. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1924).  But that changed in the period before WWII, when courts held
that so long as the Communist Party was a legal political party, an accusation of membership
was not defamatory per se. See Garriga v. Richfield, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup.Ct. 1940).  Once
Russia joined with the Nazis to divide Poland, however, the communist label again became
intrinsically defamatory. See, e.g., Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.
1945); Levy v. Gelber, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
177 See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1257, 1267 (1998) (“Norms develop most clearly and most easily in a static commu-
nity.”); cf. Post, supra note 171, at 1009 (observing that “privacy understood as subsisting in
the ritual idiom of civility rules can exist only where social life has the density and intensity to
generate and sustain such rules”).
178 See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 943, 978 (1998); Barry Wellman et al., The Social Affordances of the Internet for
Networked Individualism, 3 J.  COMP. MEDIATED COMM. 8 (2003).
179 See CHRISTOPHER LUEG & DANYEL FISHER, FROM USENET TO COWEBS: INTERACTING
WITH SOCIAL INFORMATION SPACES 139 (2003).
180 Vivian Franco et al., Anatomy of a Flame: Conflict and Community Building on the
Internet, in KNOWLEDGE AND COMMUNITIES 210 (Eric L. Lesser et al. eds., 2000) (“Contrary
to existing literature that treats ‘flames’ as undesirable, we suggest that a ‘flame’ can help
communities identify common values.”).
181 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 38. R
182 See Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating
Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54, 55–56 (1968) (“To assume a common culture or normative
consensus in American society, as in most modern societies, is to ignore the deep and divisive
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c. Reputation as Property
The third, and most dominant, conception of reputation embodied in
American defamation law is that of reputation as property.  This is the view
of reputation in the marketplace.  Under such a view of reputation, an indi-
vidual earns her reputation through “the exertion of talent” or by demon-
strating “mechanical skill and ingenuity.”183  When there is harm to
reputation, it is “capable of pecuniary admeasurement.”184  Indeed, the value
of the resulting loss is “determined by the marketplace in exactly the same
manner that the marketplace determines the cash value of any property
loss.”185
As Professor Post observes, “[t]he concept of reputation as property,
together with the image of the market society that it carries within it, can
create a powerful and internally coherent account of defamation law.”186  For
example, because reputation as property views the purpose of defamation
law as protecting individuals within the market, the law should not remedy
“purely private injuries which are independent of the market.”187  This limi-
tation is reflected in defamation law’s admonition that statements that are
merely unflattering, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing are not actiona-
ble.188  It is also reflected in the fact that corporations and other entities can
sue for defamation,189 which can only be understood as advancing a concep-
tion of reputation as property.190
We see evidence of the view of reputation as property in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.191  In Gertz, the Court held
that absent proof of actual malice, the common law’s presumption of dam-
ages is unconstitutional when matters of public concern are involved192:
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it
allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without ev-
idence of actual loss. . . . [T]he doctrine of presumed damages
invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compen-
role of class, ethnic, religious, status, and regional culture conflicts which often produce
widely opposing definitions of goodness, truth, and moral virtue.”).
183 THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM
MAGNATUM AND FALSE RUMOURS xx (1826).
184 STARKIE, supra note 183, at 101.
185 Post, supra note 7, at 694.  This view can be traced to Thomas Hobbes who wrote that R
the “Value, or WORTH of a man, is, as of all other things, his Price.” THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 42 (1651).
186 Post, supra note 7, at 696. But the view of reputation as property is not entirely com- R
mensurate with the law of defamation, fundamental aspects of defamation law remain “inex-
plicable from the perspective of reputation as property.” Id. at 699.
187 Id. at 695.
188 SACK, supra note 111, § 2.4.1.
189 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 561-562 (1977).
190 Post, supra note 7, at 696. R
191 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
192 The majority did not explain why the presumption of damages was nevertheless consti-
tutional if a defendant had actual malice. See id. at 395 (White, J., dissenting).
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sate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false
fact.  More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in
securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of
money damages far in excess of any actual injury.193
The conclusion that defamation law should only provide compensation for
“actual injury” and that the state has “no substantial interest” in awarding
additional damages, is a view “plainly within the framework of reputation as
property.”194
Yet the Court in Gertz did not entirely adopt the view of reputation as
property, as the Court included within its list of compensable harms “im-
pairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering.”195  This expansive definition of actual
injury is inconsistent with the concept of reputation as property because it
remedies harms that are not “capable of pecuniary admeasurement.”196
Although certain aspects of defamation law can only be understood by
reference to the view of reputation as property, this view fails to account for
the constitutive role that society plays in creating reputation.197  Instead, rep-
utation as property is a highly individual-centric view of reputation in which
“[o]ne’s good name is . . . as truly the product of one’s efforts as any physi-
cal possession.”198  Perhaps this view should not be surprising, given that
American defamation law arose during the period of the ascendency of indi-
vidualism.199  It was, and remains, strongly shaped by this worldview.  As
the sociologist Robert Bellah observed, “[o]ur tendency to think of reputa-
tion in individualistic terms is rooted in our cultural emphasis on the auton-
omy, independence, and achievements of individuals.”200
Moreover, unlike the view of reputation as honor or dignity, the view of
reputation as property embodies a starkly different conception of society.  It
is a conception in which “individuals are connected to each other through
the institution of the market.”201  And it is one in which the role that social
193 Id.
194 Post, supra note 7, at 730. R
195 418 U.S. at 350.
196 STARKIE, supra note 183, at xxvi.  Professor Post concludes that the Court’s expansive
definition of actual injury indicates that it was influenced by the conception of reputation as
dignity, which would permit the recovery of mental anguish stemming from violations of so-
cial norms.  Post, supra note 7, at 729–30 (“The influence of the concept of dignity is entirely R
implicit, perceptible only in the actual outcome reached by the Court. . . . If a plaintiff has had
his dignity impaired by the violation of a civility rule, it is prima facie defensible to compen-
sate him for all injuries which flow from that violation, including mental anguish and personal
humiliation.”).
197 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
198 Von Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation II, 4 COLUM.
L. REV. 33, 33 (1904).
199 See Bellah, supra note 27, at 743 (“America is a culture that focuses on the individual, R
a culture in which ‘individualism’ is a central value.”).
200 Id.
201 Post, supra note 7, at 695. R
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interactions have in creating reputation and individual identity is remarkably
limited.  Under the view of reputation as property, social interactions are
essentially meaningless unless they are mediated by the market.
While it may be the case that the “market” provides a convenient mea-
suring stick for evaluating reputation, it is an incomplete measure.202  As
noted in Parts I and II, altruistic behavior, which is remarkably common-
place in human social systems, is strongly motivated by reputation.  Such
altruism is perplexing to economists because it cannot be valued in the mar-
ket.203  But that does not mean that those behaviors and the reputational in-
terests that underlie them are valueless.
As human society has become more networked, “nonmarket econo-
mies” have proliferated.  These are economies in which reputation functions
as a form of “social currency.”  We see this quite clearly in the context of
peer production, such as open source software development, where reputa-
tion, rather than money, is a primary motivation for the work.204
2. Defamation Law Serves Competing Interests
As the preceding discussion reveals, once we probe below the surface
of the various conceptions of reputation inherent in the law of defamation,
we see that defamation law is built on the shifting sands of assumptions and
policymaking.  It should come as no surprise then that “the state’s interest in
reputation can have no single outcome.”205
Nevertheless, a court must choose between competing interests in indi-
vidual cases.  The preceding abstract discussion of the interests protected by
defamation law can be further clarified focusing on the specific harms the
parties and society experience as a result of defamatory speech.206  These
harms basically fall into five categories:  (i) pecuniary loss by the plaintiff
caused by the defamatory statement (i.e., loss of property); (ii) non-pecuni-
ary loss by the plaintiff consisting of emotional and physical distress (i.e.,
loss of dignity); (iii) non-pecuniary loss by the plaintiff and society consist-
ing of reduced standing (i.e., loss of relations); (iv) loss by society stemming
from the defendant’s failure to adhere to community norms (i.e., loss of ci-
vility); and (v) loss by society occasioned by impoverished discourse.
The first of these harms clearly implicates the view of reputation as
property, whereas the remaining harms fall largely within the conception of
202 Indeed, the common law has a “passion for reducing disputes to money damages, a
passion that for defamation law has been ‘a crippling experience.’” Id. at 720 (quoting J. G.
FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 207 (2d ed. 1986)).
203 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
204 Id.
205 Post, supra note 7, at 693. R
206 See Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence, 29 OX-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 603, 611 (2009) (“It is submitted that the only principled approach is to
look at the type of losses which the wrong seeks to remedy, and consider that the correlative
interests are those which come within the scope of protection of the tort.”).
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reputation as dignity.  While the conception of reputation as dignity and the
conception of reputation as property both remain influential in American
defamation law, these conceptions of reputation are, in important ways, doc-
trinally incompatible.207  Indeed, “[t]he conflict within defamation law is so
severe that it is incapable even of specifying coherent criteria by which pub-
lications can be distinguished as defamatory or nondefamatory.”208  It should
come as no surprise, then, that defamation law is largely unsuccessful at
advancing either the plaintiff’s interests or society’s interests, even when
those interests are aligned.209
Moreover, society’s interests do not all point in the same direction.  For
example, society clearly has an interest in proscribing “antisocial communi-
cations” that harm reputation because these communications pose a chal-
lenge to its proper functioning and identity.210  In addition, society has an
interest in ensuring that speech that impacts reputation has some measure of
reliability because its members rely on reputational information to make as-
sessments about the character and standing of others.211
Yet society also has an interest in maintaining “a suitable level of dis-
course within the body politic”212 which can be in tension with these other
concerns.  This interest bears directly on the “marketplace of ideas” ratio-
nale for freedom of speech in First Amendment jurisprudence,213 and embod-
ies the notion “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”214  In Cohen v. California,
in which the defendant challenged his conviction for “wearing a jacket bear-
207 For example, the doctrine of presumption of damages is consistent with the view of
reputation as dignity, but not with the view of reputation as property. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text.  On the other hand, the fact that corporations can sue for defamation is
consistent with the view of reputation as property, but not with the view of reputation as
dignity.
208 Post, supra note 7, at 717. R
209 See infra Part IV.
210 Defamation law’s proscription of “antisocial communications that harm reputation”
acts to preserve a community’s identity, “for it is the existence of shared values and shared
beliefs that defines community life.”  Lidsky, supra note 25, at 37.  By remedying “a wrongful R
disruption in the ‘relational interest’ that an individual has in maintaining personal esteem in
the eyes of others,” Smolla, supra note 131, at 18, it necessarily brings within its purview the
civility rules that define communities and hold society together.
211 See Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 528 A.2d 64, 67 (N.J.
App. Div. 1987) (observing that “defamation is an impairment of a ‘relational’ interest, i.e., it
denigrates the opinion which others in the community have of plaintiff”); Solove, supra note
103, at 551 (“We are thus deceived in our relationships with others; these relationships are
tainted by false information that prevents us from making sound and fair judgments.”).
212 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (emphasis added).
213 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (holding that
restrictions on independent corporate expenditures “interfere[ ] with the ‘open marketplace’ of
ideas protected by the First Amendment”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (“[A] central tenet of the First Amendment [is] that the government must remain
neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978))); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 10-33 (1982).
214 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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ing the words ‘Fuck the Draft,’” 215 Justice Harlan described society’s interest
as follows:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in
a society as diverse and populous as ours.  It is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity . . . .
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often
appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utter-
ance.  These are, however, within established limits, in truth neces-
sary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process
of open debate permits us to achieve.  That the air may at times
seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of
weakness but of strength.  We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in
what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of in-
dividual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal
values are truly implicated.216
This is a powerful articulation of free speech principles grounded in
tolerance and individual autonomy.217  But even Justice Harlan conceded in
Cohen that this tolerance must exist “within established limits.”218  One such
limit, for example, is obscene speech.219  Another is intentional—or at least
negligent—defamatory speech,220 but exactly where that limit should reside
with regard to such speech “depends a great deal on the importance one
attaches to the intensity of community life and to the exercise of freedom of
expression as a reflection of individual autonomy.”221
The problem, however, is that judges usually frame the issue as an ab-
stract conflict between the First Amendment’s free speech protections and
“reputation.”  But reputation is not a single, undifferentiated interest.  It is a
215 403 U.S. at 16.
216 Id. at 24-25.  According to Robert Post, this passage from Cohen “rests flatly upon a
repudiation of the maintenance of community cohesion and identity as a legitimate justifica-
tion for the regulation of speech” and therefore “greatly undermines the reasoning of Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which held that defamatory speech should be
exempt from constitutional protection in part because of the ‘social interest in order and moral-
ity.’”  Post, supra note 7, at 734 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). R
217 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 172 (1986).
218 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
219 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).  Interestingly, criminal libel originally
penalized obscenity, as well as defamation, sedition, and blasphemy. See J.R. Spencer, Crimi-
nal Libel—A Skeleton in the Cupboard, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 383, 383.
220 See supra Part III.A.
221 Post, supra note 7, at 736–37. R
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multifaceted concept that poses many challenges for defamation law.  As we
have seen, the various conceptions of reputation embody markedly different
assumptions about the nature of social life.  The strains created by these
divergent beliefs have only increased as our society has become more
complex.
It may simply be that the assumptions underlying important parts of
defamation doctrine are no longer, if they ever were, accurate reflections of
how our networked society functions.  As Professor Post suggested while the
Internet was in its infancy, judges “would do well to abandon the fiction of
protecting a unitary concept of reputation.”222  And society would do well to
consider the “limitations and desirability” of using defamation law “to
maintain community identity and cohesion through the enforcement of rules
of civility.”223
C. The Role of Community in Defamation Law
In this section we move to the more concrete question of how courts
determine whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning.  To en-
gage this issue, we return to the Ron Livingston case described in the
introduction.
According to the complaint in that case, the defendant allegedly “main-
tained an ongoing campaign to spread lies about Livingston on the in-
ternet.”224  This included, among other things, “falsely asserting that
Livingston is in a romantic relationship with [another] man”; “creating
websites devoted to propagating his or her lies”; and “altering legitimate
websites about Livingston to include false statements about Livingston’s re-
lationship status and sexual orientation.”225  The complaint goes on to state
that the “misrepresentations contained in the Wikipedia Page, the Facebook
Profiles, and the Facebook ‘fan page’ . . . are libelous per se because they
have a tendency on their face to injure Plaintiff’s business and reputation.”226
At first blush, the question of whether these statements are capable of a
defamatory meaning appears to be relatively straightforward.  After all, a
communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.227
In California, where Mr. Livingston filed his case, “libel” is defined as a
222 Id. at 721.  Professor Post recommended nearly a quarter-century ago:  “Instead of
constructing rules and definitions that awkwardly attempt to span the gulf separating reputa-
tion as property from reputation as dignity, the two aspects of reputation can be distinguished
and managed through different doctrinal structures.” Id. at 741.
223 Id. at 741.
224 Complaint at 2, Coupleguys, Inc. v. John Doe, No. BC-427389 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-12-
04-Coupleguys%20Inc.%20v.%20Doe.pdf.
225 Id. at 2, ¶5.
226 Id. at 4, ¶12.
227 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is defama-
tory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”).  Although, as
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false statement of fact that “exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which
has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.”228  But the “tendency” of a
statement to cause reputational harm cannot be determined merely by refer-
ence to the words themselves.229  Because harm to reputation is a socially
constructed injury,230 a court must measure its effects by the “attitudes, be-
liefs, and prejudices of the relevant community.”231
1. Identifying the Relevant Community
As a threshold matter then, the court232 must first select the community
in whose esteem Mr. Livingston’s reputation may have been diminished.233
Not surprisingly, this choice can have a profound effect on the viability of
his defamation claim.  After all, “[t]hat which is defamatory in the eyes of
one segment of the population may be laudatory in the eyes of another and a
matter of complete indifference to a third.”234
It is not necessary for Mr. Livingston to prove that every member of
society regards him with contempt as a result of the false information.  As
far back as 1909, the Supreme Court recognized that a defamatory statement
“need not entail universal hatred to constitute a cause of action,” given that
“[n]o conduct is hated by all.”235  The Court explained that it is sufficient
that “an appreciable fraction” of those who are exposed to the false informa-
tion “regard the plaintiff with contempt.”236  In making this determination,
courts consider the effect of the challenged speech on “right-thinking peo-
discussed in Part III.B.1, defamation law only provides a remedy for certain types of reputa-
tional harm.
228 CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (2009).
229 Defamation usually involves verbal statements, whether written in the case of libel or
spoken in the case of slander. See Lidsky, supra note 25, at 11 n.49.  Nonverbal forms of R
expression, however, such as photos and drawings may also be defamatory. See, e.g., Dwor-
kin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1989) (cartoon); Burton v. Crowell
Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (libel claim based on photograph).
230 See supra Part III.B.1.
231 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 13. R
232 At common law, the judge decides as a matter of law whether the statement at issue is
susceptible of a defamatory meaning. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, § 111, at 774,
780–83.
233 See SACK & BARON, supra note 174, at 48–49.
234 The Community Segment in Defamation Actions, supra note 125, at 1387.
235 Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (permitting case for libel based on
unauthorized use of plaintiff’s photograph in advertisement to go forward even though the ad
“seems to be regarded by many with pride”).
236 Id. The Restatement follows this approach, noting that it is not necessary that the
communication expose the plaintiff to the hatred, ridicule or contempt of the entire commu-
nity; instead, “it is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice [the plaintiff] in
the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority” of those who hear the challenged speech.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
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ple”237 or among “a substantial and respectable minority” within society,238
with the latter test now the prevailing American rule.239
For purposes of Mr. Livingston’s case, his concern is not with how soci-
ety writ broadly views homosexuality, but rather whether those in his profes-
sion, moviemakers in Hollywood, are intolerant toward homosexuals.
Where is a court to turn to make this determination?  The evidence appears
to be conflicting.  As Gabriel Arana, who recently questioned whether actors
suffer any reputational harm from being labeled as homosexual, wrote in
Slate:  “Ellen DeGeneres came out . . . to an audience of 42 million; when
Clay Aiken did so . . . no one blinked. Dozens of shows . . . have openly gay
cast members.  Movies like Milk and Brokeback Mountain—with plots fo-
cusing on gay rights—are mainstream.”240  Others are less sanguine, caution-
ing:  “I would not advise any actor necessarily, if he was really thinking of
his career, to come out.”241
One might assume that all Mr. Livingston needs to do is put forth a
witness to testify that Hollywood casting directors avoided him or over-
looked him for movie roles because of the false imputation of homosexual-
ity.  At this stage in a defamation case, however, the question is not whether
casting directors did, in fact, avoid or overlook Mr. Livingston.  Rather, the
question is whether the statements at issue have the tendency to create the
type of reputational harm the tort of defamation will recognize.242  Just be-
cause a plaintiff has actually suffered harm is not dispositive of this question
and, surprisingly, may not ever be relevant given defamation law’s presump-
tion of damages.243
Moreover, despite the objective veneer that accompanies the “substan-
tial and respectable minority” test, courts rarely seek evidence such as wit-
ness testimony, polls or surveys on this question.244  Instead, the
determination “often involves a largely ‘intuitive’ judgment about the beliefs
and attitudes of society at large and of particular groups within it, a judg-
ment largely based on the judge’s own ‘common knowledge’ and common
sense.”245
237 Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1930).
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
239 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 16–17. R
240 Gabriel Arana, Queer Eye for the Libel Guy: Should Stars Really Be Able to Sue For
Libel if Someone Says They’re Gay?, SLATE, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2212339.
241 Carole Cadwalladr, I Wouldn’t Advise Any Actor Thinking of His Career to Come Out,
OBSERVER REVIEW, Nov. 29, 2009 at 4 (interview with actor Rupert Everett), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/film/2009/nov/29/rupert-everett-madonna-carole-cadwalladr; see also
McKellen Slams Producers for ‘Keeping Stars in Closet,’ HOLLYWOOD.COM, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://www.hollywood.com/news/McKellen_Slams_Producers_for_Keeping_Stars_in_Closet/
3676824.
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
243 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
244 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 18 (citing David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair R
Game and Fair Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1304–08 (1942)).
245 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 18 (quoting The Community Segment in Defamation Actions, R
supra note 125, at 1389).
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We see the problems inherent in this approach when we examine how
courts have treated the question of whether a false imputation of homosexu-
ality can support a defamation claim.  Over the years, a number of defama-
tion cases have been filed based on the imputation of homosexuality.246  As
recently as 1996, scholars were reporting that “the overwhelming majority
of courts that have addressed the issue have held that a false allegation of
homosexuality is defamatory.”247  But norms can “evolve from one genera-
tion to the next.”248  And as one court aptly put it, whether a statement is
defamatory depends “upon the temper of the times, the current of contempo-
rary public opinions, with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one
community, may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a
different place.”249  For example, whereas it was once regarded as defama-
tory to falsely imply that a white person is black,250 that is no longer a view
held by courts today.251
But norms do not change overnight nor are they susceptible to easy
quantification.  Unlike defamation claims based on false racial or ethnic
identifications, courts “have not been so eager to validate a progressive
point of view in cases dealing with homosexuality.”252  But this is beginning
to change.  While some courts still hold that an imputation of homosexuality
246 One of the earliest cases involved Oscar Wilde, who in 1895 initiated a criminal libel
action against Lord Queensbury in response to written note that said:  “For Oscar Wilde posing
as a somdomite [sic].”  Dean R. Knight, “I’m Not Gay—Not That There’s Anything Wrong
with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 249, 258 (2006) (citing THE THREE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE (H. Montgomery Hyde, ed.
1956)).  “On the third day of the trial, Wilde’s counsel withdrew the prosecution, not because
the allegations did not convey a defamatory meaning, but instead because of Lord Queen-
sbury’s pleas of justification.  Lord Queensbury argued ‘his resort to ‘sodom’ mimicked the law
and therefore was for the public good.’” Id.
247 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 34–35 (citing Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App. R
1980); see generally Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977); Nazeri v.
Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Rejent v. Liberation Publ’g, Inc.,
611 N.Y.S.2d 866 (App. Div. 1994); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980);
Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959)).
248 Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
249 Beamer v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Cal. 1983).
250 See, e.g., May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671 (La. 1910); Bowen v. Indep.
Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957).  In Bowen v. Independent Publishing Co., the South
Carolina Supreme Court reasoned:
Although to publish in a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro imputes no
mental, moral or physical fault for which she may justly be held accountable to
public opinion, yet in view of the social habits and customs deep-rooted in this State,
such publication is calculated to affect her standing in society and to injure her in the
estimation of her friends and acquaintances.
96 S.E.2d at 566.
251 “Whereas the earlier cases take the attitude that it obviously is defamatory to call
someone a Negro, the more modern cases (to the extent they exist) tend to assume it is equally
obvious that such an allegation is not defamatory.”  Lidksy, supra note 25, at 30-31 (summa- R
rizing recent cases).
252 Id. at 34.
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is defamatory per se,253 a number of recent decisions have rejected this con-
clusion.254  What splits these courts, however, is not whether being falsely
identified as homosexual would result in some opprobrium.  They all seem
to accept that prejudice exists in the dark corners of every community.
Rather, they view their role as standing up against this prejudice.
Judge Denny Chin’s recent decision in Stern v. Cosby exemplifies this
approach.255  Judge Chin cited a “veritable sea change” in attitudes about
homosexuality over the past few decades and concluded that New Yorkers
do not “view gays and lesbians as shameful or odious.”256  Although Judge
Chin conceded that “gays and lesbians continue to face prejudice,” he made
it a point to note that “such prejudice on the part of some does not warrant a
judicial holding that gays and lesbians, merely because of their sexual orien-
tation, belong in the same class as criminals.”257  Quoting Judge Nancy Gert-
ner’s earlier decision in Albright v. Morton,258 in which she cautioned that if
a court “were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per
se—it would, in effect, validate that sentiment and legitimize relegating
homosexuals to second-class status,”259 Judge Chin held that an imputation
of homosexuality is not defamatory per se.260
One of the societal changes cited in both Stern and Albright was the
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated state
laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy between consenting adults.261 Law-
rence undercut an argument that many of the cases coming to the opposite
conclusion had relied upon, namely that an allegation of homosexuality im-
puted criminal conduct.  Other cases, including a California appellate deci-
sion from 1980,262 relied on the “equally outdated—but probably less legally
253 See, e.g., Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree italiane-Societa Per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d
520, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Thomas v. BET Sound-Stage Restaurant/Brettco, Inc., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 448, 457 (D. Md. 1999); Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, 122 F.3d 308, 310-11 (5th
Cir. 1997); Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ. 0471 (JFK), 1995 WL 565990, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 1995); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993).
254 See, e.g., Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Albright v. Mor-
ton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136–39 (D. Mass. 2004); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1023-25
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 575–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Key v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 598 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990).  None of these
decisions, however, have gone as far to hold that an imputation of homosexuality cannot be
libelous.  Instead, they leave open the possibility of recovery if the plaintiff can show specific
harm flowing from the allegedly defamatory statements. See, e.g., Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at
275 (holding that statements imputing homosexuality are not defamatory per se but may
“nonetheless [be] susceptible to a defamatory meaning”); Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1025 (holding
that imputation of homosexuality is not slander per se while questioning in dicta whether such
imputation should be defamatory at all).
255 645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
256 Id. at 273–74.
257 Id. at 275.
258 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004).
259 Id. at 138.
260 Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
261 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
262 Schomer v. Smidt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 828, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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vulnerable—argument that calling someone a homosexual imputes lack of
chastity.”263  Whether this argument would still carry the day is an open
question.264  “Many adult American women [and men, no doubt] might well
consider it more harmful to be called ‘unchased’ than ‘unchaste,’ the com-
mon law to the contrary notwithstanding.”265
The purpose of analyzing the defamatory character of the allegations in
the Livingston case, however, was not to definitively answer the question of
whether an imputation of homosexuality is, or should be, defamatory.
Rather, it was to shed light on the normative judgments inherent in defama-
tion law’s assessment of whether a statement is capable of a defamatory
meaning and to highlight the difficulty of applying these doctrines when
social mores are changing.
What this discussion makes plain is that it is not at all clear how a court
would come out on the question of whether the false imputation of homosex-
uality is defamatory.  Moreover, the answer cannot be determined by polls,
surveys, or even past precedent.  The answer turns on the proper role the
court sees defamation law—and by extension, itself—playing in enforcing
conflicting social norms, which, in turn, is influenced by normative judg-
ments a court makes about the acceptability of the norms themselves.
When even members of the LGBT community are conflicted over
which strategy to pursue in their efforts to change social norms,266 judges
seem especially ill-equipped to make these decisions, particularly when they
are doing so through guise of defamation law.  Naturally, the question then
becomes whether this is the proper role for the law of defamation in the first
place.
2. The Myth of Community
As the preceding discussion reveals, defamation law rests on normative
judgments that are deeply reflective of how judges envision society.267
While we might fervently wish that in our pluralistic society people would
not hold irrational and invidious prejudices, judges, of all people, know that
this is not the case.268  As a result, judges are forced to decide whether they
263 Sam Bayard, Office Space Star Ron Livingston Sues Wikipedia Prankster, Community
Norms at Issue, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.citmedialaw.
org/blog/2009/office-space-star-ron-livingston-sues-wikipedia-prankster-community-norms-
issue.
264 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63
MD. L. REV. 401, 461–64 (2004).
265 SACK, supra note 111, § 2.4.4.
266 See, e.g., Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of
Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 L. & SEXUALITY
119, 152–55 (2003) (describing the arguments on both sides).
267 We see this in both the community segment determination and in a court’s assessment
of what harms defamation law will recognize. See supra Part III.B.1.
268 See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 42–43 (1985) (not-
ing that we resort to “subterfuges and wishful thinking” because we “are unwilling to admit
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should take society as it exists, warts and all, or as they desire it to be.  And
on this critical question, defamation law offers little guidance other than the
admonition that the community chosen be “substantial and respectable.”269
While the substantial and respectable minority doctrine offers the
“promise of recognition and respect for subcommunity values,” it fails to
live up to this promise because it “imports a normative vision of the com-
munity into the process of identifying defamatory communications through
the loaded words ‘substantial and respectable.’” 270  By labeling certain com-
munities insubstantial or disrespectable, judges are free to ignore the norms
of communities they find disagreeable.  As a result, defamation law is natu-
rally and unavoidably hegemonically structured.  Instead of enforcing norms
extant in the plaintiff’s actual community, it enforces “the views of the dom-
inant groups in society or, more aptly, what the judge believes to be the
dominant groups in society.”271
We also see these normative judgments operating in the many cases
involving allegations that the plaintiff was an informer.272  In one such case
involving a prisoner, the court noted that although the general prison popula-
tion may regard the plaintiff with contempt as a result of a broadcast that
labeled him an informer, “it is not one’s reputation in a limited community
in which attitudes and social values may depart substantially from those pre-
vailing generally which an action for defamation is designed to protect.”273
A court reaching the same conclusion in a similar case explained that “those
who would think ill of one who legitimately cooperates with law enforce-
ment officials are not [right-thinking persons].”274
Moreover, there is an inherent circularity in the task of determining
which community’s norms are entitled to enforcement.  The community de-
fines the norms that bind its members,275 but the community is itself defined
by the norms its members share.276  As a result, a society can have as many
communities as there are shared norms.277  This presents a fundamental, and
perhaps insurmountable, challenge for the law of defamation.
openly that some groups in our flawed society may have attributes which are undesirable and
even dangerous”).
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
270 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 40.  “Moreover, the doctrine makes it appear as if it applies R
only in special cases, those relatively rare cases where no general consensus can be found[,
and] in effect papers over ideological conflict within the society and obscures the extent to
which mores are in a state of flux.” Id. at 40–41.
271 Id. at 9.
272 See, e.g., Agnat v. Shakur, 30 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Saunders v.
Board of Directors, WHYY-TV, 382 A.2d 257 (Del. Super. 1978); Connelly v. McKay, 28
N.Y.S.2d 327, 329-30 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
273 Saunders, 382 A.2d at 259.
274 Agnat, 30 F. Supp.2d at 424.
275 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
276 Id.
277 The noted social anthropologist F.G. Bailey, who studied social interactions in pastoral
villages in Europe, India, and Cyprus, remarked in his influential work on reputation, Gifts and
Poison: The Politics of Reputation, that “[c]ommunities and societies are made up of people
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In 1996, at the very start of the popularization of the Internet, Professor
Lyrissa Lidsky observed that defamation law was laboring under the “myth
of community.”278  That is, a myth that there is “such a thing as a ‘commu-
nity’ characterized by ‘groups of like-minded individuals . . . who share a
common heritage, have similar values and norms, and share a common per-
ception of social order.’” 279  This observation is even more apt today.
The community segment determination that lies at the heart of defama-
tion law’s defamatoriness inquiry is premised on the belief that community
norms are widely shared and relatively static.280  While the view of social life
inherent in the law of defamation—that society is comprised of relatively
homogeneous communities that enjoy widespread consensus on social
norms—may have been accurate during the common law’s formative period,
it is no longer accurate today.281  Indeed, no one would call the Internet a
static community with widespread consensus.282
Instead, our networked society is comprised of countless communities
and subcommunities, many of which are “diffuse, sparsely knit, with vague,
overlapping, social and spatial boundaries.”283  As Yochai Benkler has ob-
served:  “[T]he image of ‘community’ that seeks a facsimile of a distant
pastoral village is simply the wrong image of how we interact as social be-
ings.  We are a networked society now—networked individuals connected
with each other in a mesh of loosely knit, overlapping, flat connections.”284
Moreover, we are likely to be members of multiple communities, both
substantial and insubstantial, that span racial, socioeconomic status, and per-
sonal interests.285  And we are likely to play different roles in these commu-
nities simultaneously as we endeavor to navigate the potentially conflicting
norms and social demands of each community.  What matters to us is not the
but we only recognize them as a community or as a society, because the people who belong
share some ideas about how things are and how things should be . . . .”  Bailey, supra note 28, R
at 8.
278 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 38. R
279 Id. (quoting John Crank, Watchman and Community: Myth and Institutionalization in
Policing, 28 L. & SOC. REV. 325, 325 (1994)).
280 Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1267 (1998) (“Norms develop most clearly and most easily in a
static community.”).
281 See WENDY L. WALL, INVENTING THE “AMERICAN WAY”: THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 289 (2009) (observing that the In-
ternet, among other factors, has “increasingly divided Americans by age, income, race, and
interest”); Lidksy, supra note 25, at 41 (noting that in American society “[i]t is possible to R
speak of widespread consensus only in small, closely knit, and relatively homogeneous com-
munities (if they exist)”).
282 See Lemley, supra note 280, at 1267 (observing that “what Internet norms have man-
aged to develop have regularly been blown apart by entry”).
283 Barry Wellman et al., The Social Affordances of the Internet for Networked Individual-
ism, 3 J. COMP. MEDIATED COMM’N 8 (2003); see also JAN VAN DIJK, THE NETWORK SOCIETY:
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF NEW MEDIA 171 (2006).
284 BENKLER, supra note 3, at 376. R
285 See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEANING
OF AMERICA (1975).
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size of these communities or whether their norms conform to some artificial
benchmark, but rather the importance that individuals within those commu-
nities hold for us.286
The challenge associated with these multiple roles is especially appar-
ent in the context of sexual orientation.287  While an individual’s reputation in
one community may not be harmed by an imputation of homosexuality, it
could prove anathema in another community in which she is a member.288
Yet the substantial and respectable minority test invites judges to make nor-
mative judgments about whether these communities warrant recognition.
And if they do not, a plaintiff will receive no recovery despite suffering
actual harm to her reputation within a community that is important to her.
As a result, whole communities fall outside defamation law’s protections.
Most disturbingly, while the choice of which community’s norms are to
govern the case “is one of the chief determinants of liability,” judges rarely
articulate their reasons for choosing one set of community norms over an-
other.289  Instead, they implicitly rely on an idealized vision of society that
simply does not comport with the complex web of social interactions that
make up our complex, multicultural, multiethnic society.
IV. REASSESSING THE PROTECTION OF REPUTATION
IN A NETWORKED WORLD
With so many competing interests vying for advancement, it is no won-
der that the law of defamation is strained by the pull of divergent expecta-
tions.  As with all branches of tort law, defamation law defines and enforces
social norms.  But unlike other torts,290 defamation law operates in the realm
of speech.  As a result, its power to affect these norms is unrivaled.  Indeed,
when we review the historical sweep of defamation law, we see that the law
has often operated to impose its assumptions of how society is structured
and operates.  When those assumptions diverge from reality—as is often the
case when community boundaries are porous and social norms are chang-
286 See Daniel More, Informers Defamation and Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
503, 517 (1989) (“If the statement lowers the plaintiff in the eyes of relatively few recipients,
but if their opinion is highly important to him, his defamation action should not be denied on
the basis of the small size of this index group.”).
287 In Mary Gray’s fascinating account of how “queer rural youth” are using the Internet
to connect with others and build out social networks, she notes that “rural LGBTQ young
people understand new media, particularly the Internet, as technologies that craft and expand
their access to and the boundaries of their local and extralocal public spheres.” MARY L.
GRAY, OUT IN THE COUNTRY: YOUTH, MEDIA, AND QUEER VISIBILITY IN RURAL AMERICA 106
(2009).
288 See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667 (Ct. App. 1984)
(claim stemming from media reports of plaintiff’s role in thwarting assassination attempt of
President Ford that reported, accurately, that he was gay).
289 The Community Segment in Defamation Actions, supra note 125, at 1387.
290 A few exceptions do exist, including tortious interference with business relations and
its related torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766–74 (1977).
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ing—defamation law is not only ineffective, but also works to hinder social
advancement.291
Given that defamation law serves so many important functions, one
would expect that it has evolved along with our networked society.  But,
alas, defamation law looks today much as it did in 1964, when the Supreme
Court issued its landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,292 or even
in 1764, when colonial Americans began to tinker with the common law’s
English roots.293  Defamation law remains “perplexed with minute and bar-
ren distinctions,”294 “filled with technicalities and traps for the unwary,”295
and “riddled with ‘anomalies and absurdities.’” 296
The limitations inherent in American defamation law have been caused
in large part by the law’s failure to adapt to the realities of how our modern
networked society creates and uses reputational information.297  As a result,
defamation law does little to protect the interests of individuals or society.298
But it is not just the aforementioned doctrinal limitations that make defama-
tion law ineffective.  It also faces practical impediments stemming from the
law’s failure to account for how reputational information actually flows
through our networked society and to provide remedies that are embedded
within these flows.
With all of these doctrinal and practical limitations, one has to ask
whether defamation law is simply obsolete.  Indeed, no less of an authority
than David Anderson has suggested that “libel law is not worth re-
forming.”299  According to Professor Anderson:
291 Jerome H. Skolnick, Forward: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CAL. L. REV.
677, 677 (1986) (“Remedies that seem reasonable and proper at one time, in one community,
may appear legally and morally flawed in another.”).
292 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  Of course, Sullivan and its progeny occasioned significant
changes in the doctrines of fault, but much of the rest of the law of defamation was not
affected.
293 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2009) (noting that “if you go back and read English Law, long before the
framing, it would not be much different from many of the principles that are followed in
American state and federal courts today”).
294 FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 243 (13th ed. 1929).
295 David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1285 (1942).
296 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 4 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF R
TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971)).
297 See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983) (stating that the “doctrinal confusion” in American
defamation law is “caused in large part by a pervasive failure to accommodate constitutional
and common law values in a coherent set of standards that is responsive to the realities of
modern communications”).
298 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 488 (“The remnants of American libel law pro-
vide little protection for reputation.”); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative
to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809, 810 (1986) (concluding that defamation law
“serves the purposes of neither the parties nor the public”).
299 Anderson, supra note 2, at 489.
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 45  8-OCT-10 15:13
2010] Reputation in a Networked World 305
Abolition would leave victims of defamation little worse off than
they are today.  A few would give up recoveries, but many would
be spared the costs, emotional as well as financial, of hopeless
litigation. The public would get the benefit of information that is
now suppressed by the chill of libel law, and would be disabused
of the inferences that may be drawn from a mistaken belief that
defamatory falsehoods are generally actionable.300
As Professor Anderson concedes, “[n]o matter how much it values speech,
however, a civilized society cannot refuse to protect reputation.”301  Fortu-
nately, as Part B argues, our networked society offers, perhaps for the first
time in centuries, the opportunity for communities to instantiate feedback
mechanisms that might be able to rectify many of defamation law’s
deficiencies.
A. Network Challenges
In the not so distant past, most of our social and commercial interac-
tions were ephemeral.  Conversations quickly passed into memory.  News-
paper articles ended up on microfiche in a cabinet in the library.  Words on
television and radio dissipated into the ether.  Today, these conversations,
words, and images are occurring online, where they remain accessible for-
ever.302  As we enter the twenty-first century, it is clear that we are living a
substantial portion of our lives online.303  We work, interact with others, and
consume and create the information that we and others use to form opinions
about the world and about each other.  In short, “the Internet allows for a
radically more diverse suite of communications models than any of the
twentieth century systems permitted.”304
A number of implications flow from these changes.  First, with all of
this information now available to others, it is clear that defamation law, with
its conflicted view of reputational harm and normative judgments about
which community norms to enforce, can only address a small portion of the
information flowing through our networked society.  At the same time, our
300 Id. at 490.
301 Id.
302 With so much information about us and our interactions with others flowing as digital
bits through communication networks, MIT Professor Judith Donath asked in a provocative
essay for The Publius Project, is reputation obsolete?  “In a world in which all action is re-
corded, is there still need for reputation information?  If I can see the events of the past for
myself, is getting other people’s potentially biased and self-serving opinions about it worth
anything?  Or, has reputation become obsolete?”  Judith Donath, Is Reputation Obsolete?, THE
PUBLIUS PROJECT, Sept. 11, 2008, http://publius.cc/reputation_obsolete.
303 A recent study by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project found
that “Internet use is near-ubiquitous among teens and young adults.”  Amanda Lenhart et al.,
Social Media and Young Adults 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/
Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx.
304 BENKLER, supra note 3, at 370. R
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reputational spheres are expanding rapidly as more of our lives are lived in
“public” view.  In fact, much of the information that escapes the scrutiny of
defamation law has as much, if not more, of an effect on an individual’s
reputation than defamatory falsehoods.
Second, as our society has become more networked we have come to
expect that information will be available at our fingertips instantaneously.
Information sources that are not part of the network are largely ignored.
When a matter is in dispute, we look for answers within the network.  Be-
cause our judicial system largely exists outside the network, its ability to
influence our collective view of the world and of each other is limited.
Third, the fact that reputational information flows through networks
makes defamation law’s task of protecting reputation more challenging and
its remedies less effective.  Traditional remedies simply do not account for
the way information flows across community boundaries, facilitated by link-
ing and search.
1. Our Expanding Reputational Spheres
Throughout human history the scope of an individual’s reputation was
defined by physical geography and the limits of communication technology.
With the introduction of low-cost global communication systems such as the
Internet, identity and reputation are increasingly being decoupled from phys-
ical space.  In addition, the ubiquity of cheap cameras and Internet-enabled
video is blurring the line between public and private behavior.305
As a consequence, our reputational spheres are expanding coincident
with the reductions in privacy we are experiencing in the online and offline
worlds.  Powerful search technologies coupled with commercial databases
that unrelentingly collect, aggregate, and distribute information about us—
including financial records, mobile phone records, and global positioning
system data—are extending public scrutiny into areas that have traditionally
been private.
To understand this phenomenon it is helpful to untangle three interre-
lated identity concepts:  anonymity, pseudonymity, and authentication.306
Reputation and identity, although related, are distinct concepts.307  In order
for reputation to have value it must be associated with an identity, but that
305 The impact of this change extends far beyond reputation and has been the subject of
considerable study by sociologists and psychologists. See, e.g., JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, NO
SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1985) (observing
that the adoption of new media results in a blurring of the boundaries between public and
private).
306 Of course, none of these concepts is unique to the Internet, but their use has expanded
greatly with the capture devices developed and made available on the Internet. See DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 35–38
(2007).
307 It is beyond the scope of this article to offer a detailed definition of identity in the
Internet context. See, e.g., Andreas Pfitzmann & Marit Ko¨hntopp, Anonymity, Unob-
servability, and Pseudonymity: A Proposal for Terminology, in ANONYMITY 1–9 (H. Federrath
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identity need not include all identifying characteristics so long as reputation
can be tied in a persistent way to an individual or entity at some reasonable,
but persistent, level of abstraction.308  The use of identity abstractions, such
as social security numbers, school IDs, and even nicknames, is pervasive in
our society.  These identifiers are typically referred to as pseudonyms.
Unlike pseudonymity, anonymity generally refers to a situation where
the individual or entity discloses no identifying characteristics.309  Anonym-
ity, however, is never absolute in practice.  Traceable details always exist; it
is just a matter of how hard one looks.  This is especially true on the Internet
where every computer that connects to the network must have a unique In-
ternet Protocol address and communications are routinely logged by servers
and routers within the network.310  Accordingly, the degree of anonymity one
can maintain will vary depending on the nature of the communication, the
system used, and other circumstances.
Identity, therefore, is better understood as a continuum.  On one end is
true anonymity, in which no personally identifying characteristics are dis-
closed.  At the other end is fully disclosed personal identification.  In the
middle of this identity continuum is psuedonymity, an especially common
form of identity on the Internet.311  The Internet lends itself to pseudonymous
identity because users can generally determine for themselves how much
identifying information they disclose when they access services on the In-
ternet.  It is also relatively easy and costless to maintain multiple pseudony-
mous identities on the Internet and change them at will;312 whereas in the
ed., 2000).  For purposes of this discussion, identity is defined as the bundle of characteristics,
some immutable, others merely superficial, that are associated with an individual or entity.
308 Reputational information is of little value unless it can be tied to an identity.  Univer-
sity of Chicago law professor Lior Strahilevitz found this to be the case when he examined the
effectiveness of the “How’s My Driving” program, which encouraged other drivers to report
poor driving.  Strahilevitz concluded that the use of bumper stickers with identity markers
resulted in fleet accident reductions from twenty to fifty percent.  Lior Strahilevitz, “How’s My
Driving?” For Everyone (And Everything), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1709 (2006).  He sug-
gests that the program should be extended to all drivers and ultimately to other non-driving
conduct as well. Id. at 1759–65.  Economists have also found that individuals will invest more
in reputation building when the likelihood of their being recognized for their good behavior is
greater. See, e.g., Milinski, supra note 12, at 272. R
309 Anonymity is derived from the Greek word anwnumia, which means without a name or
name-less.  Anonymity has a long history in American society; the drafters of the Constitution
embraced anonymity—and, in fact, some relied on it themselves—for speech in the political
sphere, which they viewed as essential for the expression of unpopular opinions that would
have opened the speaker up to public approbation. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342-43 (1995).  The Federalist Papers were signed by Publius, a
pseudonym representing the authorship of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay.
See DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1974).  The Anti-Federalists, who
wrote in opposition to Publius, also used pseudonyms. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343.
310 See Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1445–50 (2008).
311 See Ken D. Kumayara, A Right to Psuedonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 448–51 (2009).
312 See Eric Friedman & Paul Resnick, The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms, 10 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY 173, 199 (2001).  Most Web sites allow users to choose a pseudonym
when they register.  Even services that identify users based on their email addresses do not
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corporeal world this is a complex process, often involving governmental in-
tervention and cosmetic surgery.  Unless someone chooses to use her real
name, most individuals interact on the Internet while maintaining pseudony-
mous identities.313
Individuals typically have more than one online identity, each with a
distinct reputation.  These identities may be associated with different
merchants, online forums, social networking sites, and virtual worlds.  In
online communities that permit pseudonymity, individuals may be required
to identify themselves to the system administrator, but to others within the
community they merely expose a pseudonym identifier to which the site will
associate a set of attributes or credentials.  As a result, a single individual
will likely have multiple reputations to go along with their multiple identi-
ties.  While someone may have good reasons for needing multiple pseud-
onyms, this can create problems with authentication and reliance in the
context of reputation.314
As the discussion on anonymity and pseudonymity shows, we can limit,
at least to some degree, the extent of ourselves that we reveal to the world on
the Internet.  Opposite forces are at work in this digital medium, however,
that drag some individuals into the public eye and unmask others who seek
to maintain some level of privacy.
In many ways, privacy is the other side of the reputational coin in that it
defines the sphere of our activities that are open to reputational scrutiny.
Generally speaking, the fewer people who know us, or the less they know
about us, the smaller our reputational spheres will be.315  As discussed in Part
III, we typically present multiple identities at different times and in different
contexts.  We present one side of ourselves when we are with our friends on
Friday night, another on Monday morning at the office, and a third when we
make purchases online.  We strive to keep these identities distinct, and pri-
vacy allows us to do so.
But our reputational spheres are expanding as more activity becomes
open to public scrutiny, a trend that has been accelerating with the prolifera-
tion of digital capture devices and broadband Internet connections.  While
prevent identity changes because users can easily acquire new email addresses through free
services like Gmail or Hotmail.
313 In the blogging context, for example, an estimated fifty-five percent of bloggers use
pseudonyms rather than their real names.  Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, Bloggers: A
Portrait of the Internet’s New Storytellers, Pew Internet & American Life Project, July 19,
2006, http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/186/report_display.asp.
314 Accordingly, in order for reputation to be reliable over the long-term, verification of an
individual’s identity must be accomplished in a trusted way so that third-parties can rely on the
identification and associated reputational information.  One approach, which has received con-
siderable public attention, is to have governments issue national identification cards that in-
clude biometric authentication such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. See,
e.g., Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 6 C.F.R. § 37 (2006).
315 See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN
AMERICA 124 (1993) (observing that privacy “makes it difficult to know others’ reputations”).
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polling reveals widespread concern about personal privacy,316 our willing-
ness to accept encroachments on our privacy belie this concern.317  For exam-
ple, we post pictures and videos of ourselves online and tacitly or expressly
approve of others who post pictures and videos of us engaging in public—
and private—activities.318  We also routinely provide personal information
when we sign up for a Web site, use a discount shopping card, or merely
browse the web.319
The degree of penetration into what has historically been viewed as
private activity is having a profound impact on reputation because behavior
once believed to be outside public scrutiny is now available for viewing by
anyone with an Internet connection.  Moreover, even when we are in places
that are ostensibly public, we assume the circle of those who can observe our
behavior extends only so far as the ear can hear and the eyes can see.  This
assumption no longer holds true in our schools,320 on our roads,321 or almost
anywhere else.
The aggregation of this information in digital databases is also changing
the nature of access to human knowledge.  Not long ago, when reputations
were built through face-to-face interactions, scant physical records of these
interactions were left behind.322  Today, our interactions with others often
leave a digital trail, especially when those interactions involve financial
316 See, e.g., Oscar Gandy, Public Opinion Surveys and the Formation of Privacy Policy,
59 J. SOC. ISSUES 283 (2003); Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion on Pri-
vacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/#polls.
317 See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 202
(2008); Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARD-
IAN UK (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.
Privacy skeptics have argued that because people do not act to stop these encroachments, they
do not care about privacy. See, e.g., Calvin Gotlieb, Privacy: A Concept Whose Time Has
Come and Gone, in COMPUTERS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 156 (David Lyon & Elia
Zureik eds., 1996); but see Kevin Lewis et al., The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College
Student Privacy Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79,
96 (2008) (finding that “public/private boundary on Facebook is implicit, normative, and inter-
nally negotiated”).
318 In the United States, more than 85% of university students are estimated to have a
profile on Facebook.com. ZITTRAIN, supra note 317, at 231.
319 Web site privacy policies have been largely ineffective in preserving privacy as to
information expressly or passively supplied by users. See, e.g., id. at 203.  These policies
usually comprise “little-read boilerplate answering questions about what information a Web
site gathers about a user and what it does with the information. Frequently the answers are,
respectively, ‘as much as it can’ and ‘whatever it wants.’” Id.
320 A search on a video aggregation site such as YouTube or BlipTV for “angry teacher”
generates hundreds of hits.
321 Another popular genre on YouTube and BlipTV is “road rage” videos which capture
bad behavior—and license plates.  In California, some people who were frustrated by single
drivers using the carpool lanes took pictures of the “offenders” and posted the photos on a
Web site.  John Borland, Privacy Jam on California Highway, CNET NEWS.COM, May 13,
2004, http://news.com.com/Privacy+jam+on+California+highway/2100-1038_3-5212280.
html.
322 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in the Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2008).
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transactions.323  The collection of vast amounts of commercial and personal
information is compiled into “credit reports” that are used by landlords,
utility companies, creditors, and employers to evaluate and assess the reputa-
tions of individuals.  Thus, “[a] data entry thousands of miles away, created
from a transaction that never involved a face, may be the single most signifi-
cant piece of information to a potential creditor, employer, or government
official.”324
Moreover, much personal information used to be publicly inaccessible
because of practical impediments to its access.  These impediments came in
the form of having to trek down to the courthouse to get the information and
the difficulty of finding information that was not indexed or otherwise
searchable.  Today, many of these information repositories are rushing to
digitize their data and make them available online.325
In the past, the difficulty of identifying a specific individual in a photo-
graph and the inability to search by name for someone made it almost im-
possible, from a practical standpoint, for others to find me in a sea of digital
bits.  But these practical impediments are becoming a thing of the past.
Most photo and video sharing sites now include extensive metadata with the
photos and videos that describes their contents, who the subjects are, and
other relevant information such as date and location.326  Moreover, digital
cameras routinely time and date stamp each photo and many now include
Global Positioning Systems data to mark the location where the picture or
video was taken.
New search technology is taking this one step further.  Facial recogni-
tion software is making it possible to search millions of photographs for
someone, even when those photos have no associated metadata.  In Massa-
chusetts, officials are using “computerized biometric technology” to search
323 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 1 (2004); Elizabeth D. De Armond,
Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1061, 1063–67 (2007) (describing the types of information collected).
324 De Armond, supra note 323, at 1068; see also Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the
First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97,
126–28 (2000) (characterizing the aggregated data about consumer transactions as “gossip”).
The collection and reporting of personal financial information is primarily governed by the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2006), which is beyond the
subject of this article.  For an excellent discussion of the FCRA’s shortcomings, see De
Armond, supra note 323, at 1098–1131.
325 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell Tales, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1.  As Adam Liptak reports, the
expungment [of criminal records] is becoming significantly harder to accomplish in
the electronic age.  Records once held only in paper form by law enforcement agen-
cies, courts and corrections departments are now routinely digitized and sold in bulk
to the private sector.  Some commercial databases now contain more than 100 mil-
lion criminal records.  They are updated only fitfully, and expunged records now
often turn up in criminal background checks ordered by employers and landlords.
Id.
326 Flickr, a popular photo site, contains metadata fields for title, description, author, GPS
location, and tags. See, e.g., http://www.flickr.com/help/tags/#37.
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 51  8-OCT-10 15:13
2010] Reputation in a Networked World 311
the state’s database of nine million digital driver’s license photographs.327
Massachusetts officials, starting with a mug shot from the Web site of
“America’s Most Wanted,” found a match to a man who had a Massachu-
setts driver’s license under another name who was eventually arrested in
New York City, where he was receiving welfare benefits under the alias on
his driver’s license.328  These technologies are unlocking vast stores of infor-
mation that were previously beyond the reach of any search engine.  With
Google’s index of Web sites, facial recognition software, and extensive com-
mercial databases, it is easy—and largely possible without cost—for anyone
to search billions of pieces of personal data in seconds.329
The expansion of our reputational spheres is also blurring the line be-
tween what has traditionally been defined as defamatory speech and the pub-
lication of private facts. How should I respond to photographs or videos
taken out of context that make me look drunk?  Or what about a situation
where the metadata attached to an unflattering photo incorrectly identifies
me as the subject of the photo?  The photos themselves could be perfectly
accurate, but the implication that comes from them may not be.
Because defamation law does not permit recovery for the exposure of
private but truthful information, or for false communications that are merely
embarrassing, many of these activities fall outside the law’s protections, al-
though they clearly have an impact on reputation.330
2. Accounting for Networked Information Flows
As discussed in Part I, reputation is not just the “facts” about a person.
It is not, for example, how many articles I have written or how little I give to
charity.  Nor is it the opinion you hold of me, no matter how well you know
me.  And it is not the sum total of everything anyone has said or written
about me.  Reputation begins to form only when all of this information is
filtered through the experiences, beliefs, and biases of others.  And it comes
to fruition only in the complex and nonlinear way this information diffuses
through society.331
The majority of debate concerning the law of defamation has been fo-
cused on the remarkably low success rate plaintiffs achieve in winning
327 Adam Liptak, Driver’s License Emerges as Crime-Fighting Tool, But Privacy Advo-
cates Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A1.
328 Id.  Use of this technology is not limited to law enforcement.  Using similar technol-
ogy, a Web site called MyHeritage.com provides genealogy services and states that it can
automatically detect faces in uploaded photos, which it then can sort into family trees. See
MyHeritage, http://www.myheritage.com/FP/Company/face-recognition.php.
329 The next phase of search technology is to integrate all of these search methods into one
integrated interface.  Google is already making strides in this direction, having announced that
its new “universal search” will find videos, images, maps, text, and other content.  Miguel
Helft, Google’s One-Stop Search to Yield Text and Images, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at C3.
330 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
331 Of course, an individual’s reputation is not static.  It is constantly being constituted and
reconstituted.
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money judgments.332  There has been far less discussion of whether plaintiffs
have been able to correct the false perceptions created by the defamatory
statements about which they sued.  This may be due in part to the difficulty
of determining success in what is essentially a subjective inquiry, but it
points to a significant blind spot in the scholarship and commentary concern-
ing the law of defamation.
Fascinating work is, however, being done by psychologists and infor-
mation theorists who are examining how information is assimilated and be-
liefs are formed.333  What this work has revealed is that belief formation is a
complicated process and that even when the facts themselves are not dis-
puted, interpretations of them can vary.334  Indeed, there are countless exam-
ples of “facts” that are widely believed but nevertheless clearly erroneous.335
Despite the wide availability of counter factual information, many false-
hoods persist.336
The traditional method for dealing with reputational injuries is to in-
voke the state’s judicial machinery by filing a defamation lawsuit in an effort
to vindicate the aggrieved individual’s legal rights.  This is done primarily by
seeking money damages because defamation law does not typically permit a
party to seek injunctive relief.337  Yet studies have shown that money is not
what plaintiffs want most.338  Instead, what they desire most is a correction
or retraction.339  Accordingly, even in the corporeal world, the traditional
332 In a study of libel litigation during the period 1974–1984, researchers at the University
of Iowa found that plaintiffs succeeded in imposing liability on media defendants in only
12.6% of the cases. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH
AND REALITY 116 tbl.6-6 (1987); see also David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflec-
tions on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 511 (2001) (reporting that
media defendants won pretrial dismissal in nearly 77% of defamation cases studied for the
period 1980-1996).
333 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA (2006); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
334 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2010).
335 See generally CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SUR-
VIVE AND OTHERS DIE (2007).
336 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2010).  Holocaust denial is one of the most studied examples of this phenomenon. See
generally DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993).
337 While it is generally believed that “equity will not enjoin a libel,” courts have on
occasion upheld such remedies. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57
SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 158–59 (2007); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries,
and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 675 (2008).
338 See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the
Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 228 (1985) (reporting that only 20% of the surveyed
plaintiffs sued to obtain money as compensation for the alleged libel).
339 The study conducted by researchers at the University of Iowa found that seventy-one
percent of the plaintiffs said they would have been satisfied with a correction or retraction.
LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 332, at 24.
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method of dealing with reputational harm is often inefficient and
ineffective.340
For reputational injuries on the Internet, the traditional approach is
likely to be even less effective.  This is due to several reasons.  First, almost
everything on the Internet is disaggregated:  reputation is disaggregated;341
information is disaggregated; and liability is disaggregated.342  While legal
vindication may come in the end, the genie cannot be fully put back in the
bottle.  Injurious falsehoods will live indefinitely in the vast data repositories
on the Internet, waiting to be pulled up and recycled by a search engine.  To
quote the sociologist Gary Marx, “one’s past is always present.”343  Moreo-
ver, because our judicial system largely exists outside the network, its ability
to correct the false perceptions created by defamatory statements is quite
limited.
a. Judicial Forums Are Not Part of the Network
Throughout most of defamation law’s history, lawsuits took place in a
legal culture that was very different from the one we know today.344  Judicial
forums were embedded in communities.  “In most early American defama-
tion trials, jurors knew the litigants and, very likely, something about rela-
tions between the parties.”345  Just as we are finding today when we examine
lawsuits directed at bloggers and other online publishers,346 defamation law-
suits in colonial times often “accompanied, or closely followed, other types
of disputes” between the parties.347  Because judges had some context within
which to understand these disputes, they were able to apply “flexible rules
that in many ways resembled the practices of local and church tribunals of
medieval England more than the complicated doctrines and procedures of
modern defamation law.”348
Moreover, early American courts “placed little emphasis on determin-
ing winners and losers according to a monetary calculation.”349  Instead,
340 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 542 (noting that “a plaintiff must incur substantial
expense” to bring a lawsuit but “[v]ery few plaintiffs suffer enough provable pecuniary loss
to justify litigating [without being able to recover presumed and punitive damages]”).
341 See supra Part I.
342 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”) grants operators of
Web sites and other interactive computer services broad protection from defamation claims
based on the speech of third parties.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
343 GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 223 (1988).
344 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, VOL.
1, 1–3 (1977).
345 ROSENBERG, supra note 49, at 16.
346 The Citizen Media Law Project, which the author directs, maintains a publicly accessi-
ble database of lawsuits, cease & desist letters, subpoenas, and other legal threats directed at
those who engage in online speech. See Citizen Media Law Project, Legal Threats Database,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/database.
347 ROSENBERG, supra note 49, at 16.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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their primary aim was to settle disputes over reputation as quickly as possi-
ble and to restore a balance in the community.350  As the historian Norman
Rosenberg notes:
Following the practice of local and church courts in England, colo-
nial tribunals also required many defendants to acknowledge in
open court or some other public forum that they had wrongly de-
famed the plaintiff.  News of such retractions traveled quickly in
small villages, and plaintiffs could hope to have their reputations
effectively vindicated.351
The situation is markedly different today.  Our current legal system of-
fers ordinary persons little hope of settling disputes over reputation expedi-
tiously.352  Defamation lawsuits take months, if not years, to be resolved in
far away courtrooms.  Rarely is the court a part of plaintiff’s community,
either literally or figuratively.  Courthouses are generally located in an im-
posing building “somewhere downtown.”  As a result, judges are no longer
embedded in the relevant communities.353  Nor, for that matter, are jurors.
Of course, the same criticism can be directed at any judicially enforced legal
doctrine, but defamation is not just applied by courts, it is defined by
communities.354
In short, we have erected doctrinal, institutional, and procedural barri-
ers to the effective resolution of disputes over reputation.  It should come as
no surprise that these barriers have made defamation law’s remedies largely
ineffective as well.
b. Judicial Remedies Are Ineffective
There is an old saying that “a lie can make it half way around the world
before the truth has time to put its boots on.”355  This statement undoubtedly
resonates with anyone who has spent time on the Internet.  We simply can-
not assume that a court’s decision will reach the same audience that saw the
defamatory falsehood in the first place or that it will have the hoped-for
effect on what people believe.
350 See Post, supra note 7, at 739 (“In this country defamation law is ultimately local law R
and, as such, is enlisted in the aspiration of local communities to create a good and wholesome
life for their members.”).
351 ROSENBERG, supra note 337, at 16. R
352 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 510.
353 In fact, a recent advisory opinion by the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee of the
Florida Supreme Court admonishes judges not to add lawyers who may appear before the
judge as “friends” on social networks like Facebook and MySpace. See Dan Macsai, Objec-
tion! Florida Bans Judges From “Friending” Lawyers on All Social-Networking Sites,
FASTCOMPANY (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/dan-macsai/popwise/objec
tion-florida-bans-judges-friending-lawyers-any-social-networking-site.  This means that judges
are even more disconnected from the network.
354 See supra Part III.C.
355 The origins of this quote are disputed, but it is generally believed to have been uttered
by Mark Twain. See Wikipedia, Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Mark_Twain#Truth.
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As an unnamed author of a note in the Yale Law Journal wrote in 1949,
somewhat facetiously, “[l]et it be assumed that judicial opinions delivered
in defamation litigation are widely read and are important operative factors
in determining social behavior.”356  But, of course, we know that judicial
decisions are neither widely read nor important operative factors in deter-
mining social behavior.  While the few decisions issued by the Supreme
Court may fit this description, the vast majority of court decisions do not.
Indeed, judges have long recognized that their decisions were largely inef-
fective in correcting defamatory falsehoods.  As Justice Stewart remarked in
his concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, “[t]he destruction that defam-
atory falsehoods can bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the
law to redeem.  Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only
hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has
been falsely dishonored.”357
But the “hope for vindication” Justice Stewart refers to is largely illu-
sory.  As countless scholars have shown, the common law’s complex and
contradictory doctrines do little to advance defamation law’s instrumental
objectives.  Plaintiffs rarely win cases and society fails to benefit from pro-
tracted litigation that has minimal, if any, impact on social norms.  Take the
informant cases discussed in Part III.  A court’s refusal to recognize that a
plaintiff’s reputation has been harmed because those who think less of an
informant are not worthy of society’s respect results in a decision that fails to
compensate the plaintiff for actual harm, and fails to “swell the ranks” of
informants.358  Similarly, “ignoring the reality of prejudice against homosex-
uals will not make homophobia go away but will leave the plaintiff who has
been falsely labeled a homosexual without compensation for his very real
injury.”359
Nor is it the case that plaintiffs are finding vindication through a court’s
determination of truth.  Because most defamation cases are focused on try-
ing to overcome, and typically lost as a result of, the fault requirements
mandated by the First Amendment, the truth or falsity of a statement often
gets little attention.360  But a finding on the question of truth is exactly what
plaintiffs—and society—really want.
While there have been few empirical studies examining plaintiffs’ moti-
vations in filing defamation lawsuits, in a study of approximately 900 libel
356 Community Segment in Defamation Actions, supra note 125, at 1391. R
357 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
358 See Lidsky, supra note 25 at 39; Community Segment in Defamation Actions, supra R
note 125, at 1391–92. R
359 Lidsky, supra note 25, at 39. R
360 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 521 (noting that “[t]ruth is little used as a defense,
though it would enable a decisive confrontation, because it may be very expensive to estab-
lish”) (quoting MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 137 (3d ed.
1987)); David A. Barrett, Libel Reform and Declaratory Judgments: A Better Alternative, 74
CAL. L. REV. 847, 861 (1986) (observing that “truth has become almost irrelevant in libel
actions”).
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cases between 1974 and 1984, Randall Bezanson and his colleagues at the
Iowa Libel Research Project reported that of the 114 libel plaintiffs they
interviewed, fewer than twenty-five percent stated that they brought suit pri-
marily to win money damages.361  Most of the plaintiffs had lived in their
communities for more than thirty years and brought suit primarily to “vindi-
cate” their reputations.362  The legal outcome, including financial reparation,
was secondary.  As the researchers put it, “underlying [the decision to sue]
in virtually every instance was a perception that falsity was at the bottom of
their grievance, and their action was directed at correcting that falsity.”363
B. Network Solutions
It is clear that the global communication networks that are the
hallmarks of our networked society have brought new challenges.  At the
same time, however, they also provide novel solutions to prevent and ame-
liorate reputational harms.  While we have experienced revolutions in infor-
mation technology in the past—such as the printing press, telegraph, radio,
and television—the Internet revolution is different in important ways.364
Those earlier technologies were what could be described as one-to-many
forms of communication.365  With the Internet, we now have a many-to-
many form of communication in which individuals are both consumer-re-
ceivers and creator-contributors of information.366  This new medium offers
unprecedented ways for individuals to interact, collaborate, and share infor-
mation across diffuse, dynamic communities.
The question is how to adapt to these changes and develop a set of
procedures—legal, social, and technological—that protect reputation while
ensuring an environment for speech that is conducive to public engagement
and vigorous debate.367  As we consider various approaches, it is obvious
361 BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 332, at 79.
362 Id. at 79–82.
363 Id. at 94; see also Walter Probert, Defamation, A Camouflage of Psychic Interests: The
Beginning of a Behavioral Analysis, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1962) (observing that “a
plaintiff does not sue simply because his reputation has been hurt”).
364 See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 1 (“The change brought about by the networked infor-
mation environment is deep.  It is structural.  It goes to the very foundations of how liberal
markets and liberal democracies have coevolved for almost two centuries.”).
365 See HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE
13 (2006) (quoting science fiction writer Bruce Sterling who wrote that “[t]he centralized,
dinosaurian one-to-many media that roared and trampled through the twentieth century are
poorly adapted to the postmodern technological environment”).
366 See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonym-
ity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139, 162 (observing that
“everyone in cyberspace is connected to everyone else through the magic of interconnectivity
protocols and can communicate instantaneously on a one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one,
or many-to-many basis with a constantly shifting (but enormous) population of other
individuals”).
367 See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
427, 428 (2009) (observing that “in the twenty-first century, the values of freedom of expres-
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that we should look for lessons in how communities, both past and present,
have dealt with these kinds of issues.  As Daniel Solove reminds us,
“[g]ossip, rumor, and shaming have been with us since the dawn of civiliza-
tion.”368  Indeed, reputation is essential to all human social systems, and
communities have always played a central role in ensuring the reliability of
reputational information.
The following sections explore the roles that law and technology should
command in crafting solutions to the challenges that come from managing
reputation in our networked world.
1. Alternative Forms and Forums for Redress
While most lawyers acknowledge that defamation law is ineffective at
protecting reputation,369 there is little agreement about what should be done.
Some scholars, for example, have proposed that we expand the legal reme-
dies available to those who have suffered reputational and other harms as the
result of false or degrading speech.370  Others have proposed more modest
reforms that seek to make libel litigation less contentious and costly.371  For
example, some of the more developed proposals suggest converting tradi-
tional defamation claims into actions for declaratory judgment.372  Marc
Franklin, a leading proponent of this approach, would permit a plaintiff to
obtain a libel judgment without the burden of proving fault.373  In return for
this expansion in the scope of liability, recovery of damages would be pre-
cluded and the plaintiff would have to prove all elements of the cause of
action by clear and convincing evidence, including falsity.374
While many of these reforms have laudable attributes, it is important to
note that they would not address the core problems identified in previous
sections.  Society could not function if every lie or harmful word were capa-
ble of supporting a lawsuit, nor would the First Amendment countenance
such a regime.  Judges will inevitably need to make normative judgments
sion will become subsumed under an even larger set of concerns that I call knowledge and
information policy”).
368 SOLOVE, supra note 306, at 105.
369 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 487 n.3 (collecting scholarly and popular criticism of
defamation law).
370 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 5, at 89; Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a R
Balance Between Free Speech and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 264–65 (2008).
371 See REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note 2 (presenting reform proposals from a number R
of scholars and organizations).
372 See, e.g., David A. Barrett, Libel Reform and Declaratory Judgments: A Better Alter-
native, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1986); Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First Amendment with
the Individual’s Reputation: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option for Libel Suits, 93 DICK.
L. REV. 265 (1989); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in
its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
373 Franklin, supra note 298, at 810.
374 Id. at 812–13.  There are a number of concerns associated with such a dramatic change
to defamation law, including some that have been raised by its early proponents. See Rodney
A. Smolla, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW 273-74 (Soloski
& Bezanson eds., 1992).
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about which harms to recognize and which social norms to enforce.  In addi-
tion, these reforms do not address the reality that judicial forums are not part
of the networks people actually use to communicate.  Moreover, even the
most well intentioned reforms face significant political and practical obsta-
cles, given the lack of organized support for reform and the fact that defama-
tion law would need to be reformed on a state-by-state basis.375
Accordingly, this article does not attempt to lay out another reform pro-
posal.  Instead, it looks for social and technological solutions that might
ameliorate some of defamation law’s deficiencies.  It does so by asking:  if
we were to design a system for the protection of reputation, what essential
characteristics should it have?
We have learned from studies in the biological, social, and computer
sciences that the system should embrace three design imperatives.  First, the
procedures for resolving disputes over reputation should be engaged
quickly.376  Second, the procedures should be embedded in the networks peo-
ple actually use.  Third, the focus should be on ensuring the reliability of
reputational information rather than on imposing liability.  This section
touches on these characteristics only briefly, as a full treatment would war-
rant several articles.
The procedures for resolving disputes over reputation should be en-
gaged quickly.  One of the most frequent complaints directed at defamation
law is that it takes too long to have any benefit.377  Yet we know that the
longer a defamatory falsehood goes unchallenged, the more likely it is to
cause reputational harm.  Accordingly, as Thomas Starkie observed nearly
two centuries ago in his Treatise on the Law of Slander, Libel, Scandalum
Magnatum and False Rumours, the opportunity to “openly rebut[ ] the cal-
umny” may be the most effective way to deal with reputational harm.378
On the Internet, those who believe they have been defamed can quickly
add their side of the story to the comments section or, perhaps, be accorded
the ability to have a link to their own Web site included with the original
statement or added to search results.379  In fact, responding to an injurious
375 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 490–91 (noting that past reform proposals “so far [ ]
have been stillborn because of opposition by the media bar and the absence of any organized
support”).
376 This is not the same thing as saying that disputes must be resolved quickly.  In the
context of dispute resolution discussed in this section, truth is not an always an “end point.”
Rather, it is more like an asymptotic line we approach over time with contributions from many
sources. See Morris B. Hoffman, Law Without Values: The Life, Work and Legacy of Justice
Holmes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 597, 622–23 (2001) (noting that the “scientific method of the
rationalists of the Enlightenment” involved seeing “[t]he path to truth [as] often winding and
always asymptotic”).
377 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 510.
378 THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM
MAGNATUM AND FALSE RUMOURS 2 (1826).
379 See Frank A. Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Re-
sults, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61 (2008) (suggesting a libel victim should get a chance to reply on
a search page or at least to indicate with an asterisk that the information is disputed); but see
James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 49, 49 (2007) (argu-
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statement might actually be more effective on the Internet than it is in the
corporeal world.  Every day in every major newspaper there are retractions
and corrections that address stories published at an earlier date.  These cor-
rections almost always appear much less prominently than the original story,
usually in a box on page A2, and many readers of the original story do not
even see the correction, let alone future readers.
The procedures should be embedded in the networks people actually
use.  As noted in Part I, self-organizing social systems naturally develop
feedback mechanisms that act to ensure the reliability of reputational infor-
mation.380  For example, in close-knit communities, members are likely to
know first-hand whether reputational information is false or biased.  If a
member of the community is known for passing on inaccurate information,
her credibility—and reputation—will suffer and other members of the com-
munity will temper the future information from her accordingly.381
Some of the most exciting work in this area is being done by MIT
Professor Judith Donath.  In her forthcoming book, Signals, Truth and De-
sign, she notes that in the online world where interactions are mediated by
technology, design can shape these feedback processes:
Mediated communication is significantly different from face to
face communication because the whole environment is con-
structed.  Here, deliberate design decisions affect every aspect of
communication:  whether you communicate by typing or speaking,
whether your comments are ephemeral or archived, whether you
are communicating with one known person or a horde of faceless
strangers.  These design decisions deeply affect the dynamics of
signaling; they determine everything from what will be reliable to
how inventive the signalers can be.382
As discussed in the next section, we are starting to see various types of
feedback mechanisms in use on the Internet.  In fact, some of these mecha-
nisms operate within individuals.  We intuitively know that not all state-
ing that this approach “pressures the wrong intermediary”).  Such a requirement would have
to be narrowly drawn so as to avoid First Amendment problems. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974) (declaring a statutory right of reply in newspapers
unconstitutional).
380 See supra Part I.A.  A branch of biology known as signaling theory studies how orga-
nisms communicate honestly despite the temptation to deceive one another when interests
conflict. See generally John Maynard Smith & D.G.C. Harper, Animal Signals: Models and
Terminology, 177 J. THEOR. BIOL. 305 (1995).  Much of this work is relevant to the question of
feedback mechanisms.  Because human language usually involves “cheap” signal costs, thus
increasing the potential for dishonest communication, humans have developed “social enforce-
ment” mechanisms to help ensure the reliability of the information being conveyed.  Michael
Lachmann et al., Cost and Conflict in Animal Signals and Human Language, 98 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13189, 13194 (2001).
381 See BAILEY, supra note 28, at 285–88. R
382 JUDITH DONATH, SIGNALS, TRUTH AND DESIGN 24 (forthcoming 2010); see also
Chrysanthos Dellarocas et al., Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms, in HANDBOOK
OF PROCUREMENT (Nicola Dimitri et al. eds., 2006).
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ments or speakers should be given the same amount of credibility.383  As a
result, we are more likely to place greater weight on a statement made by
someone we view highly and lesser weight on statements from those we
question or do not know.  This can be analogized to the writing on a bath-
room wall.  If I read something negative about myself on a bathroom wall, I
do not seek to discover who wrote the offensive statement so I can sue them
to vindicate my reputation.384  I simply assume that anyone who reads anon-
ymous graffiti on a bathroom wall is going to discount that speech.  A simi-
lar form of psychological adaptation for assessing the veracity of speech is
undoubtedly happening online.385
Indeed, the nature of the way we access information online is having a
profound effect on how people make judgments about what to believe.  In an
information environment where there were only a few authoritative sources,
errors by those sources mattered a lot.  Now we have search engines and
other tools to find information that bring thousands of potential sources to
our fingertips.  As law professor and blogger Glenn Reynolds notes:  “When
it was hard to research things, people’s impressions, half-remembered from
those sources, meant a lot.  People used to fight duels over such things.  It’s
not that way now.”386
The focus should be on ensuring the reliability of reputational informa-
tion rather than on imposing liability.387  This means developing procedures
for correcting false information or placing it in a more accurate context.388
One such approach is to enlist, through legal and social incentives, the help
of private intermediaries who are often in a position to recognize reputa-
383 See Skolnick, supra note 291, at 681 (stating that “[s]ociety, under a marketplace
theory, may best be served if the citizens do not rely on the truth of defamatory statements . . .
but rather consider these statements skeptically”); see also id. at 687 (“The New York Times
doctrine assumes that consumers of information are supposed to question, not necessarily to
believe, what they read and hear.”).
384 Of course some people do sue based on such writings. See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d
757, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (defamation lawsuit against tavern owner over statement on
bathroom wall in a local tavern stating that plaintiff “was an unchaste woman who indulged in
illicit amatory ventures.”).
385 Cf. Nicole H. Hess & Edward H. Hagen, Psychological Adaptations for Assessing Gos-
sip Veracity, 17 HUMAN NATURE 337, 352 (2006) (concluding that experiments showing psy-
chological adaptations for assessing gossip “play an important role in the evolution of
reputation-based cooperation and could be used more broadly to evaluate information received
from others”).
386 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1165 (2006).
387 As other scholars have concluded, the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area do not
preclude these alternative approaches. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation,
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2006) (noting that “the Court has never said the actual malice
rule is the only constitutionally acceptable accommodation of free speech and reputational
interests”).
388 This form of “contextualization” should be contrasted with the idea of “contextual
integrity” proposed by Helen Nissenbaum in the privacy context, which ties data privacy pro-
tection to norms of specific contexts, demanding that information gathering and dissemination
be appropriate to that context. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integ-
rity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).
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tional harms and instantiate feedback mechanisms that are essential to the
proper functioning of reputation systems.  While this may mean that some
individuals who have suffered actual harm will not be able to attain re-
dress,389 it will allow for greater innovation in approaches and, perhaps, more
effective solutions.
2. Looking to Communities for Solutions
Some of the most promising approaches are being adopted by online
“communities” that serve as “curators of public discourse.”390  Even with-
out the specter of legal liability hanging over them, a number of online
“communities” are experimenting with various forms of dispute resolution
procedures and reputation management systems.  While much work remains
to be done, we can learn a great deal from these efforts.
The term “community” is used in this section in its broadest sense as
an interacting population of various kinds of individuals or “a group linked
by a common policy.”391  As discussed in Part III, communities are no
longer constrained by physical space or direct interaction.  Communities
may be diverse, decentralized, and populated by individuals who act inde-
pendently of one another.392  While they are bounded in some way, perhaps
by a single shared social norm, that boundary can remain fluid.  Under this
broad definition, examples of communities would include neighborhood
groups, business networks, and buyers and sellers on eBay, as well as users
of Facebook, YouTube, and Google Search.  As this list suggests, connec-
tion, not affection, is the defining characteristic of a community.
Once we examine the many online communities fitting this definition,
we find that reputation systems already pervade the Internet and range from
the relatively simple Web site ranking system used by Technorati to deter-
mine the “authority” of weblogs393 to the news ranking system in use at
389 In fact, this is the state of law as it exists today. See supra Part III.
390 Cornell professor of communication Tarleton Gillespie refers to online intermediaries
such as YouTube and Facebook as “platforms” that serve as “curators of public discourse.”
See generally Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, in NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (forth-
coming 2010) available at http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/handle/1813/12774.
391 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
392 In many ways this definition of “community” is similar to Michael Madison’s defini-
tion of “informal groups,” which he argues should be given broad discretion to organize and
manage their own affairs:
A group is bounded in some way, culturally, socially, or materially—it may be
bounded by geography, territory, or other place; by discipline or practice; by mem-
bership, identity or interest, among other things–but that boundedness is neither
fixed nor firm. Informal groups, as I conceive them, are not limited to small groups
or to groups that are sanctioned or recognized by formal but non-legal rules.
Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153,
178.
393 See Technorati Authority FAQ, http://technorati.com/what-is-technorati-authority/ (last
visited May 23, 2010).
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Slashdot.com, where users select the site’s content by voting on stories.394  At
its heart, Google Search is also a reputation system.  While Google’s ranking
algorithms are a closely held secret, its search engine relies heavily on a
Web site’s reputation within a community of sites to determine its place in
the search results.395  Reputation comes into play in two ways.  First, a site’s
search ranking is determined based on how many other sites find it impor-
tant enough to link to it.  Second, Google analyzes the reputation of each site
that does the linking; sites that are themselves “important” weigh more
heavily and help to make other sites “important.”396  In other words, a Web
site’s reputation is influenced by the reputations of all the sites that link to it
(i.e., its community).
Reputation systems are being used on the Internet not just to recom-
mend news stories or search results, however, but to provide assessments of
the behavior of individuals.  One of the most developed and studied reputa-
tion systems is used by the online auction company eBay.397  Users on eBay
rate other users with whom they have transacted by giving a positive, nega-
tive, or neutral evaluation along with a short comment.398  Visitors to eBay
can use these ratings to asses a buyer or seller’s reputation before entering
into a transaction.  Although eBay’s reputation system is relatively crude in
that people can simply start new accounts if they receive negative ratings,399
empirical studies have shown that users with established reputations fare
better than new users, with buyers willing to pay, on average, 7.6% more for
items sold by established sellers with good reputations.400
There are many compelling reasons to look to communities to manage
reputational information.  Because reputation is contextual and community-
created, it makes sense to deploy communities’ assistance in resolving dis-
putes.  Communities already have some “jurisdiction” over reputation and
identity questions, at least as a matter of norm enforcement.  Indeed, a com-
394 See Cliff Lampe & Paul Resnick, Slash(dot) and Burn: Distributed Moderation in a
Large Online Conversation Space, Paper presented at CHI 2004, Vienna, Austria, April 24-29,
2004, available at http://presnick.people.si.umich.edu/papers/chi04/LampeResnick.pdf.
395 See, e.g., Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual
Web Search Engine, available at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html (last visited
February 24, 2010).
396 See Google, Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/technology/ (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010).
397 Considerable academic attention has been devoted to eBay’s reputation system. See,
e.g., Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortac¸su, Economic Insights from Internet Auctions, 42 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 457 (2004); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise
and Challenges of Online Reputation Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1407
(2003); Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9
EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 79, 82 (2006).
398 Resnick, supra note 398, at 82.
399 The ratings are also subject to abuse.  For example, some sellers on eBay have created
alter-egos who purchase 1-cent eBooks and then post positive feedback on the transaction.
“One such ‘feedback farm’ earned a seller 1,000 positive reviews over four days.” ZITTRAIN,
supra note 317, at 218.
400 Resnick, supra note 398, at 100.
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munity’s interest in enforcing its norms and ensuring the reliability of reputa-
tional information will likely result in its taking matters into its own hands
anyway.  “[A] group’s assertion of some control over what happens to iden-
tities and reputations are very likely to occur whether or not legal rules exist
supporting this assertion.”401
Indeed, communities may form just to deal with these types of disputes.
Some of the more interesting examples include the state “news councils,”
which are quasi-legal forums where private individuals, corporations, public
figures, and public officials can bring their complaints about allegedly de-
famatory news coverage.402  Although the specific procedures vary, typically
the complainant waives his right to bring a defamation lawsuit in exchange
for the opportunity to have the dispute resolved by the news council, which
is composed of journalists and members of the general public.403  In the case
of Minnesota’s News Council, which has been in continuous operation for
more than thirty-five years, the members encourage the parties to resolve the
dispute themselves; if that is not successful, the council schedules a hearing
in which it assesses “whether the publication was unfair, rather than a deter-
mination of whether it meets the legal definition of defamatory.”404
A less formal, but more ambitious, model for this form of dispute reso-
lution on the Internet is currently being tested by Intel and the University of
California at Berkeley.  Dispute Finder is a cross-platform tool that notifies
users when something they read on the web is disputed by a source they
trust.405  Utilizing the “wisdom of the crowd,”406 the open-source browser
plug-in allows users to designate sources they trust and flag statements they
think are incorrect or disputed.  The software then aggregates this informa-
tion to provide a visual overlay that informs users when they are viewing
something that is disputed and directs them to information on both sides of
the issue.407
Online communities have also given us tremendous new laboratories
within which to study reputation and human behavior.  Persistent virtual
worlds, for example, are especially useful for studying reputation because
401 Susan Crawford, Who’s In Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 1 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 211, 219 (2004).
402 Shannon M. Heim, The Role of Extra-Judicial Bodies in Vindicating Reputational
Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 401, 422 (2007).  “Currently, Minnesota, Washington, and
Hawaii have news councils.” Id. at 421.  The Washington News Council’s mission is “to help
maintain public trust and confidence in the news media by promoting fairness, accuracy and
balance.”  Washington News Council, http://www.wanewscouncil.org/.
403 Heim, supra note 403, at 422.
404 Id. at 424 (“Most cases that come before the news council do not meet the legal burden
established by Sullivan and its progeny, but that does not mean that the complaints lack
merit.”  Most complaints submitted to the MNC decry inaccuracy or leaving the wrong
impression.).
405 See Intel Labs, Dispute Finder, http://disputefinder.cs.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Febru-
ary 25, 2010).
406 See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF THE CROWDS (2005).
407 See Intel Labs, Dispute Finder, Frequently Asked Questions, http://disputefinder.cs.
berkeley.edu/thinklink/docs/faq.html (last visited February 25, 2010).
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“they function as ongoing social systems replete with their own forms of
governance and moral economies of practice.”408  While there are similari-
ties between virtual worlds, each world embodies Lawrence Lessig’s truism
that “code is law.”409  The structure of social relations is established and
defined by each world’s programming code and the associated end user li-
cense agreements and terms of service.  As a result, virtual worlds provide
valuable environments in which to study social interactions and test legal
rules.410
As reputation systems improve and become more pervasive, we are
likely to end up with a bifurcated medium for speech online.  One “space”
within this medium will be characterized by relatively persistent identities,
both real and pseudononymous, in which reputation systems provide feed-
back mechanisms for resolving and deterring disputes over reputation.411  A
second space will be defined by the failure of these feedback systems, which
will not function because of high concentrations of anonymous speech or
because users choose to operate outside of the feedback systems.  These two
spaces will not be physically or functionally separate; they could, for exam-
ple, exist side-by-side in the same online forum.  Rather, they will be discur-
sively distinct.  As a result, we will understand them differently.  Speech in
the first environment will be viewed as more relevant, credible, and useful.
Speech in the second environment, like graffiti on a bathroom wall, will be
discounted and largely ignored.412
We can expect, at least with regard to many of the private in-
termediaries that serve as platforms for public discourse, that they will take
on a greater role in managing reputational information as they strive to make
their platforms and services more relevant and reliable.  In a recent article in
Nature, Peter Norvig, director of research at Google, noted that one of the
408 Herman et al., supra note 77, at 191. R
409 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3 (2000).
410 See generally Caroline Bradley & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real Rules,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 103 (2004).
411 Lior Strahilevitz calls these changes the “reputation revolution” and suggests that
“[o]ur cities and suburbs are increasingly going to resemble the small towns of lore, for better
and worse.”  Strahilevitz, supra note 322, at 1668, 1671.
412 We are beginning to see this happen already.  In mid-2009, Gawker Media, the opera-
tor of a number of popular websites such as Gawker, Gizmodo, and Deadspin, implemented a
new, tiered commenting system in which comments from highly rated commenters are given
preferential exposure. See Joshua Benton, Tough Love: Gawker Finds Making it Harder for
Comments to be Seen Leads to More (and Better) Comments, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (Apr.
13, 2010), http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/04/tough-love-gawker-finds-making-it-harder-for-
comments-to-be-seen-leads-to-more-and-better-comments/.  While this change resulted in an
immediate decline in comment volume at Gawker’s sites, comments have since increased dra-
matically in number, with “average comment quality [now] higher than before.” Id.  The
Washington Post, among other website operators, is planning to implement a similar tiered
system based on the credibility of contributors. See Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, News Sites Rethink
Anonymous Online Comments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2010), at B1.
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challenges facing search engines “is to implement a measure of quality that
is not based solely on popularity.”413
Search engines must determine both relevance (is the item pertinent to
the user’s query?) and quality (is the item inherently accurate, useful and
understandable, independent of the query?).  Current relevance measures do
reasonably well.  Measures of quality require better models of the concepts
and relations expressed in documents and how they relate to the reality of
the world, as well as models of the trustworthiness of authors.  Thus, a site
that claims that the moon landings were a hoax and seems to have a coherent
argument structure will be judged to be of a lower quality than a legitimate
astronomy site, because the premises of the hoax argument are at odds with
reality.414
Returning to the Livingston case that opened this article, we see this
desire to improve relevance and reliability playing out in the Wikipedia
community.  Over the years, the Wikipedia community has developed a set
of policies for dealing with disputes over information on the site.415  These
policies lay out a multi-step process involving discussion on a user’s talk
page, informal mediation, and arbitration.416  If the dispute resolution proce-
dures fail and action is taken against a user, the policies incorporate funda-
mental notions of fairness:  notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The
administrator who issued the punishment must state the reason on the user’s
talk page and in the administrators’ block log.  The user is then granted a
right of appeal.417  In the end, Wikipedia’s procedures are generally perceived
to be just because its rules are created and enforced by the community itself.
Its success is largely due to the core principles embodied in the community:
openness, transparency, dispersed authority, trust, and kindness.418
413 2020 Visions, 463 NATURE 26, 26 (2010), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/
journal/v463/n7277/full/463026a.html.
414 Id.  Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, recently suggested the same interests are
central to Facebook’s future as well. See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm,
Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technol-
ogy/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy (“Zuckerberg said that it was important for companies like
his to reflect the changing social norms in order to remain relevant and competitive.”).
415 See David A. Hoffman & Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J.
151, 163-70 (describing the history of Wikipedia’s dispute resolution procedures).
416 Id. at 170-75. See also Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Dispute Resolution, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution (last visited February 25, 2010).
417 The first level of appeal is to the administrators as a group.  A second level of appeal
can be made to the Wikipedia Arbitration Committee which will review the user’s editing
history and prior conduct to determine whether a block or ban is appropriate. See Wikipedia,
Wikipedia: Appealing a Block, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Appealing_a_block
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
418 See e.g., Wikipedia, User: Jimbo Wales/Statement of Principles, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/User:Jimbo_Wales/Statement_of_principles (last visited Feb. 25, 2010); Wikipedia,
Wikipedia: Assume Good Faith, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WP:FAITH (last visited Feb. 25,
2010).  Or, as one essay on Wikipedia’s policy succinctly states:  “Don’t be a dick.”
Wikimedia, Meta Wiki, Don’t be a dick, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Don%27t_be_a_dick
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
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With regard to the information on Mr. Livingston’s profile that falsely
stated that he was in a gay relationship with another man, the Wikipedia
community took action long before the lawsuit was filed.419  In a detailed
expose, The Wikipedia Review traced the trail of edits to Mr. Livingston’s
profile and reported that a Wikipedia user named Blahblax, who described
himself as an “Irish guy, [who] just created this [account] after noticing
stupid things and wanting to correct them in a non-anonymous way,” was
instrumental in removing the false information.420  Over many months, the
Livingston entry was the subject of a fierce “revert war” between these
Wikipedia users.  Finally, on December 5, 2009, the false information was
permanently removed when another user with administrator privileges pro-
tected the entry from further changes, noting that she had done so because of
“[e]xcessive violations of [Wikipedia’s] biographies of living persons
policy.”421
CONCLUSION
Nearly a quarter century ago, Professor Robert Post observed that defa-
mation law was being “strained by the pull of divergent underlying assump-
tions about the nature of social reality.”422  As our society has become more
networked, it is clear that these strains have only increased.  Perhaps we are
asking defamation law to do too much:  protect individual honor, dignity,
and property; define community boundaries; enforce existing norms; vali-
date new norms; and determine which communities are right-thinking and
respectable.423
Although defamation law has an important role to play in shaping so-
cial norms,424 we must be mindful that there are limits to what the law can
realistically accomplish, especially with regard to its ability to identify (very
challenging) and enforce (practically impossible) social norms that are in
flux.  Because we live in a pluralistic society that is undergoing dramatic
419 Wikipedia has not been sued in the Livingston case.  Because of section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, it is highly unlikely that Wikipedia or its administrators would
face liability for the content on Mr. Livingston’s profile. See generally Ardia, supra note 50. R
420 It’s the Casting Director Lee Dennison Story! (Dec. 11, 2009), http://wikipediare-
view.com/blog/20091211/its-the-casting-director-lee-dennison-story/.
421 Id.  Wikipedia’s biographies of living persons policy states, inter alia:  “Editors must
take particular care adding information about living persons to any Wikipedia page.  Such
material requires a high degree of sensitivity, and must adhere strictly to all applicable laws in
the United States and to all of our content policies . . . .” Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Biographies of
Living Persons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:BLP (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
422 Post, supra note 7, at 721. R
423 And all this is supposed to be done through defamation law’s threshold inquiry:
whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. See supra Parts III.B & III.C.  This
list does not even begin to address the free speech interests implicated by the fault element of a
defamation claim. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 131, at 22–36.
424 See generally NORMS AND THE LAW (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (examining the rela-
tionship between norms and law from the perspective of law, economics, political science,
cognitive science, and philosophy).
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change, no single approach is, or should be, appropriate for all of the social
relationships defamation law brings within its ambit.  The challenge is to
devise a doctrine that accounts for how individuals and society currently use
reputation while also being capable of further adaptation as our social sys-
tems evolve in the future.
There are no simple answers.  Exploring in detail the ways this might
be accomplished is beyond the scope of this article, for the changes impli-
cate the broader realm of communication and technology policy.  Moreover,
given that comprehensive reform of defamation law is unlikely to succeed at
the present time — or be successful in achieving the law’s myriad objectives
— this article suggests that the best approach is to focus on the role that
communities can play in dealing with reputational issues.
There are, of course, reasons to be skeptical that communities will be
able to deal with disputes over reputation.  As others have noted, successful
community governance may not be replicable on the Internet, where com-
munities are diffuse, heterogeneous, and often anonymous.425  “But socio-
logical work suggests that this pessimism about online ordering might be
premature.”426  Indeed, the use of reputation and other forms of social capital
in online communities is now widespread.  And as Sam Bowles and Herbert
Gintis, two of the leading thinkers on cooperative human behavior have
noted:
Far from being an anachronism, community governance appears
likely to assume more rather than less importance in the future. . . .
In an economy increasingly based on qualities rather than quanti-
ties, the superior governance capabilities of communities are likely
to be manifested in increasing reliance on the kinds of multilateral
monitoring and risk-sharing exemplified above.427
In fact, online communities may be able to solve problems that the law
could never reach.  “An effective community monitors the behavior of its
members, rendering them accountable for their actions.”428  It does this by
relying on dispersed information that is often unavailable to government or
other organizations.429  “In contrast with states and markets, communities
more effectively foster and utilise the incentives that people have tradition-
ally deployed to regulate their common activity: trust, solidarity, reciprocity,
[and] reputation . . . .”430
We have to keep in mind that the choice is not between a legal system
that ensures that no harmful or harassing speech goes unpunished or uncom-
425 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1309-10 (1998).
426 Hoffman & Mehra, supra note 414, at 192.
427 Bowles & Gintis, supra note 65, at F433. R
428 Id. at F424.
429 Id.
430 Id.
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pensated and an imperfect system of self-help non-regulation.  As discussed
in Part III, much harmful speech is beyond the reach of defamation law
because the harm it inflicts is not a type of harm the law will protect, the
social norms it violates are not worthy of enforcement, or the remedies the
law provides are not effective in addressing the harm.  Some of these
problems may be addressable through doctrinal reforms, but no solution will
completely eradicate defamatory speech.431  Instead, we must recognize that
law, alone, cannot solve the problems we face.
Accordingly, the most effective solutions will likely involve a combina-
tion of technology, policy, and law.  The final section of this article lays out
a framework for evaluating the role that technology should play.  On this
point, we have reasons to be optimistic that technology can instantiate some
of the most important aspects of community governance.  New social tech-
nologies are allowing informal communities to rapidly form and take on
many of the functions traditional communities once played in managing dis-
putes over reputation.432  Wikipedia is the best example, but it is not the only
one.  Reputation systems are proliferating and are already enabling further
experimentation, providing “a base of theory and practice with which to
design the next generation of [reputation] platforms.”433
431 Nor would such a solution be permissible under the First Amendment. See supra Part
III.A.
432 See Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 699 n.12 (2005) (“Arguably, yet another layer is now evolving that
facilitates the formation of complex social groups based on exchanges of bits and effective use
of the metainformation that is generated by these exchanges.”).
433 Hassan Masum & Yi-Cheng Zhang, Manifesto for the Reputation Society, 9 FIRST
MONDAY 7 (2004), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1158/1078.
